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THE ATLANTIC PACT

Halford L. Hoskins

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THE ATLANTIC PACT



Edmund Duffy in Saturday Evening Post

The Atlantic Pact

By HALFORD L. HOSKINS

Public Affairs Press

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Dr. Halford L. Hoskins has been a close student of international affairs for a considerable number of years and has distinguished himself as a teacher, an administrator and a writer in the international field. He has traveled widely in Europe and the Middle East and has served on various committees and commissions concerned with questions of an international nature. He was the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the director of both the School of Advanced International Studies and The Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. He served also as a war-time consultant on territorial matters in the Department of State. At present he is a Senior Specialist in International Relations in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Among his several writings are the following books: *British Routes to India* and *European Imperialism in Africa*.

Preface

The ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty by the Senate was an essential step in bringing the United States into peace-time alliance with eleven other states of the North Atlantic area. Although the event itself does not constitute a revolutionary change in United States foreign policy, it does significantly point up the trend away from a policy of isolation. The many and grave issues that already have appeared and will follow in the train of the treaty inevitably will call for reappraisals of the elements of sound foreign policy from time to time in a world where isolation, for all practical purposes, has ceased to exist and where among important members of the international community differences in philosophy and in standards of conduct already have produced a cold war.

Considering that the welfare of all the peoples of the world depends primarily upon the measure of success with which international issues are dealt with by the principal world powers, the North Atlantic Treaty and its attendant problems are deserving of the most careful analysis. The present study has been made with the object of placing in perspective the problems that have given rise to the Atlantic Pact and some of those inherent in it as an aid to the understanding of this aspect of United States foreign policy. No attempt has been made in the accompanying text to deal with all of the problem areas represented by the Atlantic Pact, but the more fundamental ones have been characterized.

This study has evolved from several memoranda prepared by the author, with the assistance at particular points of members of the staff of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, for the use of members of the Congress. These memoranda were originally undertaken at the suggestion of Dr. Ernest S. Griffith, Director of the Legislative Reference Service, to whom the author is indebted for the opportunity to present to the public, in this form, some of the more essential and significant aspects of United States participation in the North Atlantic Alliance.

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Trends in U. S. Foreign Policy

On March 18, 1949, the Department of State made public the text of the North Atlantic Treaty. That event has been viewed by many as a clear break with the past in American foreign policy and as the beginning of a new era in foreign relations because of the decision of the United States Government to enter *in time of peace* into a political alliance with states outside of the western hemisphere, one which envisages the possible use of force. On mature consideration, it is clear that the Atlantic Pact does not mark any sudden or revolutionary change in the basic foreign relations of this country.

From the earliest days, the groups that came together to form this nation were members of a North Atlantic community. Both before and since the achievement of independence the American people, most of whom are of European origin, have been closely associated through ties of language, institutions, and culture with the peoples of western Europe. Significantly, every major war in which Western Europe has been involved since the founding of the American colonies has been reflected in this country.

Now that the problems facing the nations of Western Europe are also the problems of the United States, as they were at the beginning of its national history, and now that the physical distance between American and European shores, measured in time, is no longer of great consequence, it need not occasion great surprise that foreign policy is adjusting itself to reality and that the United States—and Canada—have entered into an association with nations of similar outlook in Europe to ward off and to deal with a common threat of aggression.

Throughout the history of the United States, the most characteristic feature of its foreign policy has been the measures taken to establish safeguards against aggression. The deliberate adoption of a policy of isolation in the early days of the republic, epitomized in the Monroe Doctrine, was aimed at the possibility of aggression from without. As long as the protective width of the North Atlantic enabled the nation to follow its own bent without undue risk, a policy of aloofness un-

doubtedly was sensible. However, when aloofness has been unrealistic, the nation has not long hesitated to take up arms and to employ them within or outside of the Western Hemisphere in order to halt aggression or the threat of aggression. This was illustrated to a degree by the Spanish-American War of 1898-99. In this brief struggle the prime aim of the United States was to end the misrule of Spanish governors in revolutionary Cuba. More emphatically pertinent was United States participation in World War I in association with a European alliance and in World War II in formal alliance with European states.

Patently aimed at the threat of aggression from beyond the Western European sphere, the Atlantic Pact does not create a North Atlantic community, but it overtly identifies that community and recognizes the interdependence of its members. It is, in one sense, a formal pronouncement that the defense of North America, in these days of advancing technology and shrinking distances, requires the defense of the whole North Atlantic basin. The pact at last gives the North Atlantic community a formal status and makes provision for joint counsel and effective action in the interest of the security of members of the community and the peace of the world.

In summary, it may be said that the evolutionary changes in American foreign policy which have taken place in the interval between the Monroe Doctrine and the Atlantic Pact are due fundamentally to the following factors:

1. *The rapid shrinkage in time-distance.* During the past century this process has been going on at an accelerated rate until now most of the feeling as well as the actuality of American isolation has disappeared.
2. *The experience of two World Wars.* The advent of the First World War found the American people not only militarily unprepared but intellectually convinced that war as an institution had been permanently outmoded. At the end of this war to "make the world safe for democracy," the United States took steps to outlaw war and to avoid becoming similarly entangled in the future. Only as the shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles and its offspring, the League of Nations, became apparent did doubts arise as to the elimination of war on a major scale and as to the possibility that the United States could remain aloof from future struggles. World War II very nearly completed the disillusioning process. The lessons drawn from it were much more realistic than those derived from previous experience. Today the American people are determined to make the world safe for the United States. They fully recognize that this can best be accomplished through

the functioning of the nation as a leading member of the world community. Consequently, the part taken by the United States in the development and activities of the United Nations has been as prominent as it had been lacking in the work of the League of Nations.

3. *Arrival of the atomic age.* The instructive experience of World War II has been reinforced powerfully by the march of science. The rapid advance which has been made in the development of supersonic vehicles, long-range bomb-carrying planes, and in the atomic bomb itself drives home the realization that no degree of American isolation is any longer even possible. In any future war of world proportions it is obvious that there will be no margin of time for building up armaments once the conflict has begun.

Following on the heels of a war which required the presence of American forces in practically every part of the globe, these forces have brought most of the American people to a major point of departure from earlier concepts of what constituted sound bases for American foreign policy.

Rather tentatively, but with hardening purpose, the United States has embarked on a new and untried program of attempting to preserve world peace and, with it, security for American ideals and institutions through far-reaching economic aid, accompanied by political assurances. A new chapter in the history of American foreign relations is now in the making.

Steps in the Evolution of Policy

The Atlantic Pact, which gives visible form to this new trend in foreign policy, is a significant step beyond certain other measures that have been taken since the beginning of World War II. The steps leading up to the pact, each showing a definite advance in thought and decision, are outlined below.

Lend-Lease

Strictly speaking, this initial step in the reorientation of foreign policy, dating from January, 1941, was an emergency measure born of war. It represented the length to which a peace-loving nation might go short of war to attempt to preserve an environment in which its own institutions might flourish.

The United Nations

For the sake of survival, the non-Axis powers of every hue had achieved a considerable degree of coöperation before the close of World

War II. At that time it seemed not unlikely that peace could be assured after victory by joint measures which would obviate any future German effort at expansion and conquest. Anxious to preserve this unity of the victorious powers and to insure a lasting peace through a system of collective security, the United States took a leading part in the studies and discussions which resulted in the promulgation of the Charter of the United Nations on June 26, 1945. As a participant in this international organization, the United States assumed general responsibilities of an international nature for an indefinite period.

The Truman Doctrine

The failure of the Soviet Union and its satellites to live up to the international commitments they had assumed during and immediately after World War II has had a powerful influence in shaping the aims of the United States. When it became clear in the post-war period that the real intentions of the Soviet Politburo constituted a threat to world peace and to the integrity of free nations, it became necessary to check the Soviet practice of overrunning defenseless states to bring them into the Soviet-dominated totalitarian system. This gave rise to the "policy of containment" and took the form of financial and moral assistance to Greece and Turkey,¹ two of the small states being subjected to great pressures, and diplomatic support to Iran, which was threatened with partial dismemberment. These decisions were intended originally as stop-gap measures, but with the passage of time it has become clear that without an over-all plan based on a shrewd appraisal of vital American interests in the post-war world such efforts could have but temporary and limited virtue.

The Marshall Plan

A more comprehensive program was laid out in the Marshall Plan. In view of the impossibility of a return to normal life in any measurable length of time, if at all, by the defenseless and war-ravaged democracies of Western Europe, and in view of the obvious hope of the Soviet Union that the economic distress of European states could be utilized as a means of bringing them within the Iron Curtain, the conclusion was reached in Washington that such means as could be provided by the United States, even at considerable sacrifice, to restore the self-sufficiency and the self-confidence of these nations would contribute powerfully to world stability.

In the course of this heavy undertaking it came to be realized that while the Marshall Plan, depending on the earnest coöperation of the

peoples aided, might succeed in bringing about economic restoration, the psychological handicaps under which these nations were struggling, owing to fear of aggression, naturally would lead to the diversion of an abnormally large share of their revenues to defensive measures to the detriment of sound recovery. Consequently, to give further support to the measures already embarked upon to rehabilitate these peoples whose moral and political philosophy rests on criteria cherished in the United States and whose continued existence as independent nations is essential to the security of those in the Western Hemisphere, there gradually appeared to be no good alternative to a mutual defense pact.

The Rio Pact

In keeping with provisions of the United Nations Charter, the United States had been participating, meanwhile, in the formation of a hemispheric security pact. Since this pact is indicative of the extent to which the outlook of the American people had been undergoing fundamental changes and since it is an important link in the chain of events leading to the North Atlantic Pact, it is appropriate briefly to review interim developments in the Western Hemisphere.

In February and March of 1945, shortly before the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the American nations—minus Canada—met in an Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City. There they agreed, among other things, to expand their system of collective self-defense to include the proviso:

"That every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, shall . . . be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this Act."²

Inasmuch as the conclusion of an agreement involving the possible use of military force was thought to exceed the authority of the executive branches of at least some of the governments represented at the Conference, this Act of Chapultepec recommended the conclusion of a treaty which would give permanent form and validity to the principles contained in the Act.

After some delay, a conference representing twenty of the American nations was opened on August 15, 1947, in a suburb of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this conference, the final session of which was addressed by President Harry S. Truman, the United States delegation led the way in the formulation of a treaty to implement the Act of Chapultepec. The resulting document was comprehensive and precise.³ In substance,

it constructed, under the over-all provisions of the United Nations Charter, an inter-American defense system, formally condemning war but making provision for armed action in common in the event of aggression from an external source or for the purpose of keeping the peace amongst the American states.

The Rio Pact was generally regarded in this country as being fully in keeping with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. It was concluded and ratified with no thought that it might serve as a precedent for regional pacts elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, the mutual defense provisions and the leading part taken by the United States in its negotiation had a considerable bearing on those provisions of the Atlantic Pact which call upon the United States to forego its traditional hemispheric isolationism.¹

1. The "Truman Doctrine" was outlined in the President's address to the Congress on March 12, 1947, in which he advocated that the United States should enter upon a policy which would "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Other excerpts from that address are given in Appendix 4.

2. Louise W. Holborn, *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations* (Boston, 1948), vol. II, pp. 1123-26.

3. Pertinent portions of the Rio Pact are cited in Appendix 5.

4. See discussions of the Rio Pact in the Department of State White Paper issued on March 19, 1949 (Publication 3462), pp. 6-7.

II

U. S. Experience With Treaties of Alliance

Partly in consequence of earlier isolationist tendencies and partly owing to its time-distance from transoceanic nations, the United States has had little actual experience with international pacts in its century and three quarters of independent life. Being preoccupied during most of this period with its internal affairs and impressed with the admonition of its first president to avoid foreign entanglements, this nation, consciously avoided alliances up to World War II.

The Limitations of International Law

At various times in its history, however, the United States has come in direct contact with international alliances and in the present century it has found them occasionally useful, having learned that they are natural and inevitable products of the modern state system.

While there have grown up during the past few hundred years rules of procedure called international law, the modern world still is composed primarily of a group of politically independent, self-governing states each of which claims every sovereign right. The resort to international law, therefore, has been purely voluntary. When national honor, security, or other vital interests are at stake, nations invariably have placed their particular interests above the restraints of international law. To all intents and purposes, consequently, the world of today is a lawless world. This is not because a system of public international law or a world court or an international organization are non-existent, but because of the unwillingness of nations always to conform to such authority as exemplified in the World Court and the United Nations. Force, therefore, is the ultimate means of pursuing national policy and cannot be left out of account in any kind of international relations. This is a lesson still imperfectly understood by those who would excise from the North Atlantic Treaty every reference to the employment of force.

The Necessity for Alliances

Varying as they do in extent of territory, size and vigor of populations, natural resources, strategic position and ideals, nations neces-

sarily vary in the extent to which they are able to implement their policies with force. Not many nations possess the elements of force to an extent which will insure the success of their policies and the inviolability of their territories and other material interests. In fact, at no period in modern times has any single state possessed the strength or geographical position to warrant a line of conduct in the international sphere which would fail to take cognizance of the attitude of potential enemies. Since no one of the great powers has been able to dominate all or even most of the other powers, and since, in making up totals of strength, even the lesser states not infrequently count materially, there has been a pretty constant jockeying for friends and for position. Hence, at any time since the modern state evolved from medieval disorder, the international situation can be understood fully only by reference to international alliances.

That alliances are useful or even essential, in the absence of any other means of providing for security in a badly divided world, cannot be doubted. The Charter of the United Nations, which was brought into existence to help preserve the peace and to bring about a more orderly world, not only does not place impediments in the way of the contracting of international alliances, but under Article 52 it actually makes provision for the forming of alliances of a regional nature, assuming undoubtedly that any pacts formed under the auspices of the Charter will have included provision for the employment of force in the face of certain kinds of contingencies.

It follows that in order to possess any virtue at all an alliance must have some potentialities of an offensive character. That is not to say that it will necessarily possess aggressive traits. There are not many constants in our present world. Alliances are formed for a great variety of reasons and under widely varying circumstances. Some have been of brief duration, others have extended over many years. Some have set forth the purposes of the signatories frankly and sincerely; others have concealed, between the lines of published text or in secret articles, their real intent. Some have been agencies for peace, others—not always intentionally—have led to armed conflict.

The French Alliance of 1778

In order the better to evaluate the Atlantic Pact as the latest and probably the most significant of the hundreds of pacts of the past few centuries, it should be worth while to look briefly at the alliances with which the United States has been particularly concerned during its national lifetime.

It may be noted first that the very existence of the United States as a nation stems importantly from the alliance concluded with France on February 6, 1778, in the midst of the war for independence.¹ As far as the American nation was concerned, this alliance was contracted primarily for defensive purposes. However, it was offensive as well as defensive in character. Its virtue lay in bringing the weight of France to bear against Great Britain in new ways. Inasmuch as territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Great Britain was contemplated by both allies, the alliance had a definitely aggressive tone. In the best European tradition, the alliance treaty contained, in the form of a separate act or protocol, a secret provision for a formal understanding with a third power—Spain—and it contained, furthermore, mutual guarantees of the territorial holdings of the allies. There are few forms of international assurance not represented in this, the first formal international engagement entered into by the Founding Fathers.

The observation may be added that, having only lately sprung from European origins and being then dependent to a considerable extent on oceanic trade, the United States at the time of the Revolution had more of an international outlook than was apparent until the early days of World War II. Even so, the young republic regarded the conduct of its ally, France, with such misgivings that the treaty and the accompanying protocol were abrogated by an Act of Congress ten years afterward—i.e., in 1788.

During the years that followed, the United States had instructive experience with other European alliances. Brief reference to two of these may serve to bring into clearer relief the meaning of the Atlantic Pact.

Instructive Experience with European Alliances

At the close of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the victorious powers formed a Quadruple Alliance² (known as the Grand Alliance or Concert of Europe), having as its object the preservation of the peace of Europe by any means practicable. By employing the "doctrine of intervention," this alliance contrived to prevent popular uprisings on the European continent for more than a generation. However, the threatened application of the doctrine to certain Spanish colonies in the Americas was the occasion for the pronouncement in 1823 of the Monroe Doctrine, supported at the outset quite as substantially on the eastward side by Great Britain as by the United States on the westward.

Another European alliance, signed on October 31, 1861,³ organized

to enable Great Britain, Spain and France by joint action to recover damages from Mexico, put the Monroe Doctrine to its severest test. Taking advantage of the early days of the American Civil War, a combined fleet reached and threatened Vera Cruz. Thereupon the *de facto* Mexican Government undertook to make amends and the British and Spanish contingents presently withdrew. French forces continuing alone were instrumental in setting up in Mexico the short-lived Empire of Maximilian, oblivious alike to protests from and offers by the United States to assume Mexican obligations to France.

This, the only instance in which the Monroe Doctrine ever has been wholly contravened, provides one of the best illustrations of the aggressive designs that may be concealed in a treaty of alliance whose avowed purposes are largely in keeping with accepted international usage.

Because of its traditional attitude toward "entangling alliances" and the character of earlier experiences, the United States was unwilling to join the alliance against the German Empire during World War I, preferring to work hand in hand with the Allies as an "associated" power. Even after the close of the war this country was too intent on seeking security in isolation to become a member of the League of Nations, conceived by its own President as a principal means of insuring the world against major conflicts. As the League displayed weaknesses and sank into desuetude, its sponsors sought other expedients.

As early as June, 1927, Aristide Briand, the French Premier brought forward a proposal for a Franco-American treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Supported by great numbers of seekers after peace in the United States and elsewhere, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg countered with the suggestion that such a treaty be made multilateral to be the more effective. Briand agreed on condition that the pact be restricted to "wars of aggression." The British Government favored the pact, but reserved liberty of action with regard to "certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety." The United States adhered to the pact with the understanding that it would in no way interfere with the right to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in the name of self-defense. Asserting that "the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare . . . that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another",⁴ the pact was signed by sixty-one states. However, it had no

appreciable effect on the tenor of international policies and the wars that were already in the making.

The reasons are not far to seek. Only in rare instances in modern times have nations deliberately sought war. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, most of them have chosen to fight rather than to accept alternatives which appeared to involve loss of prestige, growing weakness relative to other states, loss of opportunity for aggrandizement, or loss of territory.

The Kellogg Pact undoubtedly expressed the idealistic desires of most nations, but it failed to meet the practical problems which inevitably arise in international relations and it was destitute of means of enforcement. To all intents and purposes, it was another Holy Alliance—laudable but innocuous. Far from harboring aggressive potentialities, the Kellogg Pact was innocent even of any defensive character. "What it really amounted to was indicated by the ironic fact that its ratification by the United States was accompanied by the enactment of a bill materially increasing the strength of the American Navy."⁵

Down to 1939 and the opening of World War II no formula had yet been devised, after many attempts, whereby peace-loving states could unite safely, yet effectively, to counteract and prevent aggression. The costly lessons of another world war had still to be learned and the foreign policy of the United States modified in consequence before the high standards of enlightened idealism and the demands of political reality in an undisciplined world could be combined in terms of the United Nations Charter and the Rio and North Atlantic Pacts to warrant some optimism, almost for the first time, for the future of international relations.

1. The text of this document may be found in William M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers, 1776-1909* (Washington, D. C., 1910), vol. I, pp. 479-482.

2. Not to be confused with the contemporary Holy Alliance, a highly idealistic but innocuous pact formed at the instance of Tsar Alexander I. The text of the Quadruple Treaty of Alliance may be found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 3 (1815-16), pp. 273-280.

3. The text is given in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 51 (1860-61), pp. 63-65.

4. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Washington, D. C., 1942), vol. I, pp. 153-157.

5. Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Political and Cultural History of Modern Europe* (New York, 1936), vol. II, p. 1034.

III

European Background of the Atlantic Pact

World War II ended with the complete elimination of one great power alliance—the Third Reich, Italy and Japan—and the serious weakening of components of another—notably France and Great Britain, neither of whom had wholly recovered from the effects of World War I. World leadership thus largely devolved upon the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In spite of serious injuries suffered during the late war, the Soviet Union emerged with many industries intact, boundaries enlarged, a huge and industrious population, and a conviction that the future greatness of the state lay in aggrandizement through power politics, in shrewdly exploiting the element of timeliness in this process, and in keeping all populations under Soviet control from contact with the democracies. Policies of this nature, consistently pursued, inevitably brought on a "cold war" and thereafter effective forms of coöperation in the international community of necessity began to take shape in agreements and pacts of a local or regional nature.

European Economic Groupings

For purely local reasons, one instance of regional grouping had taken place before the close of World War II.

Evolving from studies of common economic interest covering a period of about fifteen years, a convention was signed on September 5, 1944, by representatives of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (all then in exile in London) in anticipation of a complete post-war economic union of these three states. According to early plans, this union, termed Benelux, would be in full operation by July, 1950.¹

Other moves in the direction of regional arrangements followed. On September 13, 1947, an official joint commission was created to study the practicability of a Franco-Italian customs union. The commission's report, recommending the proposed union, was approved by both governments in February 1948, and a treaty providing for the inauguration of the customs union within a year's time was signed in Paris on March 26, 1949.² The four Scandinavian countries—Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland—meanwhile had begun consideration of a similar economic association.

With the introduction of the European Recovery Program attention was given to ways and means of coordinating the efforts of the smaller economic groupings. In September 1947, there came into existence a joint study group representing 13 of the 16 countries embraced by the Marshall Plan. It was planned at that time that this group would work closely with the International Trade Organization as soon as the latter was established. Stemming from this, considerable progress has been made toward a West European Customs Union, scheduled to come into operation before 1951 and to continue indefinitely beyond the termination of the European Recovery Program. To be sure, these have been cooperative experiments in the field of economic rather than political affairs, but they have exerted considerable influence on preparatory moves in political affairs. There can no longer be any sharp line of demarcation between the realms of economics and politics, either intrastate or international.

Nuclei of Political Pacts

European political cooperation designed to preserve the general peace may be regarded as commencing with mutual assistance pacts between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and France, in the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1942, and in the similar Franco-Soviet treaty of December 20, 1944. Although these alliances may have had some virtue during the closing days of World War II, they began to lose significance as international instruments once the war had ended and new adjustments became necessary.

Growing coolness between Great Britain and the Soviet Union marked the decline of any possible security system based on mutual assistance pacts among the major states aligned against Germany. In a broadcast on December 22, 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin declared that Britain did not recognize bonds with any other state except as under the United Nations Charter. The Soviet organ *Pravda* immediately seized upon this statement as a repudiation of the Anglo-Soviet alliance. In an exchange of notes with Stalin, Bevin denied any breach of the treaty and stated that he regarded the treaty as still in full force. Stalin, however, remained unconvinced and refused the British suggestion that the pact's duration be extended from twenty to fifty years. More recently the only apparent function of either this or the Franco-Soviet alliance has been to provide the Soviet Union with grounds for attacking the legality of the Atlantic Pact.

Even before the close of the late war a cleavage between the states of Western and of Eastern Europe was clearly discernible. Shortly after,

with the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of December 12, 1943, the Soviet Union embarked on a series of alliances with the other states of Central and Eastern Europe and thus gradually developed the bloc now bounded by the Iron Curtain.³ The more recent drawing together of the Western European states in political alliances has been, to quite an extent, a response to the formation of the Soviet bloc with its philosophy of world revolution and its policy of subversive activities in non-communist countries.

The Dunkirk Treaty

On March 4, 1947, at Dunkirk, a fifty-year treaty of alliance between Great Britain and France was signed. In a statement issued on the same day, the British and French Foreign Ministers made clear their hope that this treaty soon would become a four-power pact through the inclusion of the United States and the Soviet Union⁴—the other members of the Four Power Council of Foreign Ministers. However, every effort during the remainder of 1947 by representatives of the four powers to reach agreement on reparations and European reconstruction ended in deadlock. By the early months of 1948 the rift between the Soviet Union and the free nations could no longer be denied. On the one hand, the Marshall Plan (ERP) was being put into effect; on the other, the activities of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and the Soviet bloc rapidly cemented close alliances between and among the vassal states of the U.S.S.R.

It was in this atmosphere that British Foreign Minister Bevin made a momentous speech in the House of Commons on January 22, 1948. He spoke of the situation in Eastern Europe as presenting the western nations with a *fait accompli* and concluded that "the free nations of Western Europe must now draw closely together." He expressed the hope that treaties achieving an "ever closer unity" would be signed with the Benelux states and others, including Italy. "We are thinking now of Western Europe as a unit," he said.⁵

The Brussels Pact

The response to Mr. Bevin's views was immediate. By February 19 the draft of a five-nation treaty—embracing Great Britain, France and the Benelux states—was complete and on March 17, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed. The preamble of this instrument is significant, both as to the ideological bases defined and the practical application envisaged:

[The titular heads of the participating nations],

"Resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage; To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united; To cooperate loyally and to coordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery; To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression: . . .

"Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence, . . . have agreed . . ."⁶

Thus, out of local and regional experiments in economic coöperation and an unhealthy international political atmosphere emerged a new type of peace-time organization popularly known as Western Union.

Intended as a partial implementation of the United Nations Charter and as a political supplement to existing cooperative arrangements of an economic nature, Western Union appears to contain the germ of what may prove to be a still more significant form of union—a kind of Government of Western Europe. The draft constitution for the Council of Europe was approved by representatives of 10 of the Marshall Plan nations comprising the Organization for European Economic Cooperation of the ERP meeting in London on March 28, 1949. The draft makes provision for a parliamentary government consisting of an executive council, a "Cabinet of Europe", and a consultative assembly or "Parliament of Europe." For the time being, the functions of the Council of Europe do not transcend those of Western Union with respect to military matters or the OEEC with regard to over-all economic matters, but it is regarded by some thoughtful observers as the most promising step taken thus far toward European unity of action.⁷

Toward a North Atlantic Regional Defense Alliance

As a means of providing for collective security, even in the European sphere, Western Union, at the outset, represented more hope than assurance. By its very nature it did not include the United States, which alone could make the pact effective in terms of armaments,

funds and moral force. Only an expansion of Western Union to include the North Atlantic area could bring in the American nation, and fortunately this was no longer out of the question. The United States already had departed from its traditional attitude with respect to treaties and engagements of a political nature outside of the Western Hemisphere in becoming a member of the United Nations. In the United Nations Charter it is specifically provided that:

"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."⁸

Here was a formula that was susceptible of being put to very practical use in the interest of collective security.

It was the persistent use of the veto by the Soviet Union in United Nations deliberations that brought the leaders of the Western states to the point of resorting to the Charter alliance formula. The United Nations being powerless, in the face of Soviet tactics, to make any real progress in providing for international coöperation, it was clear to leaders on both sides of the Atlantic by the spring of 1948 that regional arrangements in keeping with Charter provisions would need to be undertaken. Exploratory conversations looking toward a North Atlantic security pact were begun in Washington at the instance of members of the Brussels Pact in July 1948.

1. Andrew and Frances Boyd, *Western Union: A Study of the Trend Toward European Unity* (Washington, 1949), pp. 54-55; *The Economist* (London), vol. 156, no. 5508 (March 19, 1949), p. 508.

2. Boyd, *cited*, p. 56; *New York Times*, March 27, 1949.

3. See Appendix 8.

4. In April, 1946, Secretary Byrnes had proposed a twenty-five (later extended to forty) year treaty to keep Germany disarmed which came to grief on the question of German reparations.

5. Boyd, *cited above*, pp. 60-61.

6. See Appendix 6 for other portions of the text.

7. *New York Times*, March 28 and 29, 1949.

8. Article 52, paragraph 1 of the U. N. Charter. The full texts of Articles 51, 52, 53 and 54 are set forth in Appendix 3.

IV

Steps Toward the Alliance

The suggestion made by Winston Churchill in his speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, that the United States and Great Britain join in a fraternal association upheld by a military alliance for mutual defense in a tense world was well received in the United States, but it inspired no action. There still was much faith in the United Nations as an organization which would promote international accord and obviate the need for old-fashioned power alliances.

As the actions of the Soviet Union in the post-war period failed to tally with its words and tended to incapacitate the machinery of the United Nations, American opinion began to undergo a change. Perhaps no single act of the Soviet Union made a more profound impression than communist seizure of control in Czechoslovakia, a state which has long been regarded with friendly interest by the United States. From that point (February, 1948) forward the steps leading to the negotiations on the North Atlantic Pact came in fairly rapid succession.

The European Recovery Program

The European Recovery Program (ERP), by which the United States assumed a large measure of responsibility for the economic restoration of war-ravaged Europe, exerted a considerable influence on American thinking. The setting up of the Economic Coöperation Administration (ECA) in the United States and the establishment overseas of the Organization of European Economic Coöperation (OEEC), embracing the relevant activities of the sixteen participating countries, tended to emphasize the need of Western Europe for a political counterpart of the economic program, without which, in the view of some able observers, the latter program was unlikely to fulfill expectations.

Views of President Truman

The address of President Truman to the Congress on March 17, 1948—the very same day on which the Brussels Treaty was signed—marked another step forward. The President said:

“This [the Western Union Pact] deserves our full support. I am

confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so."¹

The Vandenberg Resolution

The implications of President Truman's address were given broader outline and sharper focus several months later by Senator Arthur Vandenberg in introducing, on June 11, Senate Resolution 239.² In adopting this proposal by the impressive majority of 64 to 4, the Senate laid a new cornerstone for American foreign policy. The resolution reaffirmed "the policy of achieving international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest." Three of the six provisions of the resolution were concerned with long range "human rights and fundamental freedoms." The others dealt with regional agreements and proposed that the United States associate itself by constitutional process, "with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security." It pledged the United States to contribute to "the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 [of the United Nations Charter] should any armed attack occur affecting its national security."

The Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 19, 1948, accompanying Senate Resolution 239, made clear that the resolution was based squarely on Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter and hence was perfectly consistent with the position already taken by the United States. Senator Vandenberg has since emphasized that, in introducing the Resolution, he had not intended to go beyond "the four corners of the United Nations Charter" and that he has regarded the North Atlantic Pact as only the acknowledgment in writing of "the facts of life as they are."³

Beginning of Conversations on the Atlantic Pact

Encouraged by this attitude of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Department of State shortly afterward inaugurated discussions with representatives of Canada, on the one hand, and the Western Union states, on the other, with the object of exploring the practicability of further cooperative efforts in the interest of collective

security. Simultaneously, military representatives of both the United States and Canada began to take part in the consultations of the Permanent Military Committee set up under the Brussels Pact looking toward measures for possible joint action and, at all events, for joint practice maneuvers in advance of any arrangements that might be effected in terms of a more comprehensive security pact.

Canadian statesmen openly favored a North Atlantic alliance. The Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, already had said publicly on June 10 that "The best guarantee of peace today is the creation and preservation by the nations of the Free World, under the leadership of Great Britain, the United States, and France, of an overwhelming preponderance of force over any adversary or combination of adversaries."⁴

Significant Points in Truman's Inaugural Address

By October, 1948 agreement had been reached between the United States and Canada and the Brussels Pact members that a collective security arrangement reaching into the Western Hemisphere and concluded within the framework of the United Nations Charter was both desirable and feasible. On January 20, 1949 President Truman, in his inaugural address, gave further impetus to the conclusion of a North Atlantic pact by outlining, as one of four major courses to be pursued by the United States Government, a program of strengthening freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression and by working out with a number of them a joint agreement designed to strengthen the security of the North Atlantic area.

"The primary purpose of these agreements [he pointed out] is to provide unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the free countries to resist armed attack from any quarter. Each country participating in these arrangements must contribute all it can to the common defense . . . I hope soon to send to the Senate a treaty respecting the North Atlantic security plan. In addition we will provide military advice and equipment to free nations which will cooperate with us in the maintenance of peace and security."⁵

That there should be no delay in implementing such purposes had been expressed by the President in his Budget Message of January 10, 1949: "The instruments of our policy requiring the largest measure of budgetary support are the extraordinary programs of economic and military aid to those nations and peoples who share our international objectives and our determination to make them effective", he pointed out, while indicating that any forward estimate of international ex-

penditures must be highly tentative in view of the present uncertain world situation.⁶

The Department of State Circular

Once conversations were well under way with respect to the North Atlantic Alliance, the Department of State thought it well to issue, in January 1949, a summary statement to keep the American public abreast of developments. This took the form of a brief outline entitled "Collective Security in the North Atlantic Area." It noted that the Vandenberg Resolution—

"Is a logical extension of the decision—implicit in our membership in the United Nations—to take an active part in world affairs to insure world peace and our own security. . . . A consideration of the international situation developed during the past three years clearly reveals the major factors that make necessary the kind of policy set forth in the Vandenberg Resolution—dissensions in the United Nations, the growth of fear and insecurity, and obstruction of the coöperative efforts to eliminate the causes of that fear. . . . During three years of unavailing attempts to secure an adjustment in Soviet policies, it became increasingly evident that peace-loving nations would have to take direct action, consistent with the aims and spirit of the Charter, to prevent the further loss of freedom and to reduce the danger of aggression. . . ."

With reference to the economic aid program, the statement said in summary:

"It was clear that if a catastrophe, possibly resulting in the collapse of western civilization, was to be avoided, the afflicted countries must combine their energies and resources in a concentrated effort toward economic recovery. It was equally clear that no coöperative effort, however determined, could succeed without help from the United States.

"If world recovery is to progress, the sense of security must be restored. Since the threat of armed aggression is at the root of insecurity, collective action which will enable free nations to confront a potential aggressor with preponderant power, together with economic recovery and political stability, provides the only satisfactory antidote to fear. . . . Association of the United States and Canada with nations of Western Union in a North Atlantic regional security pact . . . will have far-reaching implications for the future peace and security of the world."⁷

To this the Secretary of State subsequently added:

"The American people unquestionably wish the great power and influence of the United States to be exerted for peace. This Government is determined to exert its influence to weave . . . a world fabric of international peace and security. . . .

"Our national security is vitally affected by the security of the North Atlantic area. The peoples of the North Atlantic area have a common heritage and civilization. We North Atlantic peoples share a common faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the principles of democracy, personal freedom, and political liberty. We believe in the rule of law among nations as among men and that the United Nations must be strengthened in its task of maintaining international peace and security.

"We believe that these principles and this common heritage can best be fortified and preserved and the general welfare of the people of the North Atlantic area advanced by an arrangement for coöperation in matters affecting their peace and security and common interest. . . ."⁸

1. Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1948.

2. The text of the Resolution is given in Appendix 7 below.

3. Quoted in an article by Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., in the *Washington Post*, February 27, 1949.

4. Quoted in *Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. 24, no. 19 (February 15, 1949), p. 228.

5. Eighty-first Congress, 1st Session, Document no. 5: Inaugural Address of Harry S. Truman, delivered at the Capitol, January 20, 1949.

6. Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1949, p. 109.

7. Department of State Publication 3377: Foreign Affairs Outlines No. 19 "Building the Peace" series, January, 1949.

8. Secretary of State Acheson's Statement: Purpose of Proposed North Atlantic Treaty (released January 26, 1949), Department of State *Bulletin*, February 6, 1949, p. 160.

V

Provisions of the Atlantic Pact

The alliance envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty results from the partial failure of the United Nations as an organization capable of maintaining the international coöperation of war time and of providing effectively for collective security in the contemporary world. The post-war activities of the Soviet Union left no practicable alternative to the free nations of Western Europe other than to seek safety from its aggressive tactics in a regional pact fully supported by the United States, the only power other than the Soviet Union capable of furnishing both the economic aid and the armaments requisite for their recovery from the disasters of war and for the preservation of their free institutions.

Formulation of the Treaty Draft

Although the essence of the North Atlantic Pact was indicated to the public almost from the preparation of the first tentative draft, no actual text was released in advance of the approval of the final draft by the governments of the original prospective member states.¹ By way of explanation, the general public was given to understand that negotiations on the Pact were conducted in official secrecy because, apparently, the wishes and interests of the proposed partners to the treaty needed to be understood and fully considered prior to such commitment as would be involved in the release of even a tentative draft; and there appears to have been a feeling that the less known by unfriendly powers of the proposed treaty content and the problems of negotiation the more effective the result might be.

The main substance of the treaty had received, as of March 11, 1949, the approbation of the foreign offices of the states constituting the original group of members. On March 8, Secretary of State Dean Acheson discussed a revised treaty text with the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Chairman and former Chairman of which had expressed misgivings concerning the treaty in its earlier stages. On this occasion these and other members of the Senate gave

informal approval to the text after suggesting minor alterations. The draft was given a further editing by the Committee of Ambassadors before being publicly released on March 18, 1949.

Main Provisions of the Treaty

The treaty text spells out in broad terms the extent to which the United States finds it expedient to undertake, under its Constitution, to define its obligations and those of other participating nations in the interest of their common security. It is a brief and simple document and, as has been pointed out in a White Paper issued by the Department of State, its powerful impact on world affairs derives from these three factors: the stature and strength of the states supporting the arrangement; the precarious world security situation to which it is designed to bring a corrective influence; and the developing unity of the North Atlantic community, "historically evident throughout more than half a century of increasing interdependence, but here formally recognized for the first time."²

The preamble of the treaty makes clear the continuing faith of the signatory parties in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter which embody their desire to live in peace and amity with all peoples and governments. It goes on to say, however, that they are determined to safeguard their own peoples and institutions, in the process of which they propose to bring stability to the North Atlantic area by uniting for collective defense.

Since the Charter of the United Nations sets forth in detail the machinery and the procedures available for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, there was no need to outline new machinery or procedures in the treaty. However, the signatories did assume certain definite obligations. They are as follows:

(1) To settle by peaceful means any international disputes in which they may become involved (*Article 1*);³

(2) To refrain from using force or the threat of force "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations" (*Article 1*);

(3) To strengthen their free institutions and to promote conditions of stability and well-being (*Article 2*);

(4) To eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic collaboration (*Article 2*);

(5) To maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack (*Article 3*);

(6) To consult together whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, the territorial integrity or political independence or security of any one is threatened⁴ (*Article 4*);

(7) To consider an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe, North America, Algeria in North Africa, or on European occupation forces or island possessions or vessels or aircraft of Alliance members within the treaty area as an attack on them all (*Article 5*); and, in consequence,

(8) To take such individual and collective action, including the use of armed force, as each party deems necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (*Article 5*);

(9) To avoid entering any international engagement in conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty (*Article 8*); and finally

(10) To participate in a council of all of the signatories to consider and report on the implementation of the pact (*Article 9*).

The North Atlantic Treaty is unique among treaties of alliance in its deference to a permanent international body in essential matters. It provides that any armed attack and all measures taken in consequence shall be reported to the Security Council of the United Nations and that such acts shall be brought to an end when the Security Council has taken steps to restore and maintain international peace and security. Moreover, it does not affect in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations.

Further Provisions

Geographically speaking, the treaty embraces the North Atlantic area and its major approaches. The original sponsors of the pact were Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United States, and Canada, with the addition of Norway in the latter stages of negotiations.

While the text of the treaty was still under consideration, these proponents agreed to admit also as part of the designated area, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal, if these desired to enter into the arrangement. It provided also that the member parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other "European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area" to become a member of the pact.

At the time of treaty signing the states agreeing to become members of the pact were those listed on the next page.

	<i>Population</i>
Belgium	8,453,000
Canada	12,883,000
Denmark	4,219,000
France	41,500,000
Great Britain	49,759,000
Iceland	134,000
Italy	45,883,000
Luxembourg	291,000
Netherlands	9,793,000
Norway	3,172,000
Portugal	8,402,000
United States of America	148,000,000
<i>Total</i>	<u>332,439,000</u>

With respect to organization, the treaty provides for the setting up of a council on which each of the parties will be represented and directs that this shall be so constituted as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council itself is to set up "such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary," but a defense committee, charged to recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5, which have to do with joint action under certain circumstances, is to be established immediately.

Other details of organization and procedure are not specified in the treaty; they are to be worked out on the basis of practical experience. It is evident that a considerable degree of flexibility in the application of the treaty was intended by those who drafted it and this will make it all the more adaptable to unforeseeable situations which may arise.

The treaty comes into force when ratified by a majority of the signatories, specifically including the seven original proponent states.

The pact is to endure without time limit. After the expiration of ten years it is to be reviewed and, if desired by the parties, revised. After twenty years any member may withdraw from the alliance by giving one year's notice.

Significant Features

There is considerable evidence that, from the beginning of conversations with regard to the alliance, there had been a remarkable degree of likemindedness among the members of the several governments respecting both the content of the treaty and the form it should take under the United Nations Charter. Since there was no doubt in

any quarter that without the full willingness of the United States to be a party to the pact its promotion would be useless, the principal question which arose during discussions of the treaty draft pertained to whether the United States could under its constitution take action involving the use of armed force in an emergency without the express approval of the Congress—an extremely important question inasmuch as it is explicit in the treaty that an armed attack on one of the members will be regarded by the others as an attack on all.

The answer to this question was found in a formula which does not bind the United States formally and automatically to go to war in the event of an attack on a member of the alliance, but which envisages the prompt taking of such action as would appear necessary, including the use of armed force, by those in responsible positions (i.e., by the President of the United States) in keeping with the nature of the emergency and without reference to a declaration of war.

Each member nation is left free to decide whether an armed attack has in fact occurred and as to what kind of action it chooses to take in this connection. This leeway represents a concession on the part of some of the European members of the alliance, but there is every indication that they are satisfied with the final form of the treaty in view of the significance of United States membership.

At a press conference on March 18th, Secretary of State Acheson undertook to give a frank analysis of the pact.⁹ He readily admitted that answers to a number of questions would still have to be found. There had been no decision, for example, as to where headquarters of the alliance would be. He left no doubt, however, that while the pact was fundamentally defensive in character, it was intended to be more than an expression of good will.

United States Approval and Ratification of the Treaty

With the object of bringing the alliance into being at the earliest moment practicable, arrangements were made by the Department of State for the signing of the treaty in Washington by the foreign ministers of all of the participating states. These arrangements were carried out in a colorful ceremony on April 4. Adding dignity and significance to the occasion, the signing was attended by both the President and the Vice-President of the United States. Shortly afterward a certified copy of the signed document was placed in the hands of President Truman for submission to the Senate for ratification, other copies being transmitted at the same time to the other signatory states to be submitted to their respective ratification procedures. According to

treaty terms, the alliance is officially in existence upon the ratification of the treaty by the majority of the signatories, including all of the seven sponsoring states, and the depositing of the instruments of ratification with the United States Government. Thereupon the alliance machinery, conceived to be not unlike that of Western Union, is to be set up and the alliance is to be ready to function.

It would appear that those who drafted the treaty text had considerable confidence that, once signed by the foreign ministers of the participating states, it would be ratified without amendment by the governments involved. Nevertheless, ratification was not accomplished in the United States without efforts from private sources to amend or defeat the measure. Some of these⁷ may have contributed to the influences which permitted other items on the Senate legislative calendar to receive priority of consideration.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held exhaustive hearings on the treaty. Some reluctance to approve its text arose from apprehension that the constitutional right of the Congress to declare war might be circumvented by treaty powers enabling the Chief Executive to make use of the armed forces without congressional authority in the event of an emergency arising under the pact. This issue was resolved in conference by a compromise expressing the sense of the Committee: (1) that the authority of the President to use armed forces in an emergency without the specific consent of Congress would not be increased or decreased in any way and (2) that nothing in the treaty shall abridge the sole power of Congress to declare war. This agreement, which was little more than a reiteration of respective constitutional powers, did not take note of the fact that while presidential powers are not thereby increased, their scope of operation will be greater under the official warrant of a treaty which becomes a supreme law of the land.

The treaty was unanimously reported by the Committee to the Senate for favorable action on June 6, 1949. The report cited fifteen reasons for its recommendation, recapitulating essentially all of the arguments advanced in favor of the alliance.⁸ The treaty, consequently, was brought up for debate in the Senate on July 5th and on July 21, 1949 was approved by a vote of 82 to 13, the necessary margin being two thirds of the Senate present and voting.

1. Department of State, Publication 3464 (March, 1949), *The North Atlantic Pact*. The full text of the treaty is given in Appendix 2.

2. Department of State, Publication 3462 (March, 1949), White Paper on *The North Atlantic Pact*, p. 2.

3. By becoming parties to the treaty, Italy and Portugal, which are not members of the United Nations, accepted those obligations set forth in article 2 of the Charter with reference to the settlement by peaceful means of any international disputes in which they may become involved.

4. Secretary of State Acheson, at his press conference on March 18, stated his belief that developments anywhere in the world which might affect the security of a member of the alliance would require consultation.

5. *New York Times*, March 13, 1949.

6. *New York Times*, March 19, 1949.

7. For example, James P. Warburg, "An Alternative Proposal," in *The Nation*, March 19, 1949, pp. 331-333; and Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Regional Facts: Strong Points or Storm Cellars?" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 3 (April, 1949), pp. 351-368.

8. *Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on The North Atlantic Treaty*, Senate Executive Report no. 8, 81st Congress, 1st Session, pp. 27-28.

VI

Limits of the Defense Area

The interest of the Western Union countries in a political pact designed to afford them a larger measure of safety from unwarranted external attack needs no spelling out. The five members of this group comprise the heart of Western Europe and represent the highest development of European culture. They are foremost among the "free" nations of Europe, having taken the lead in the development of democratic principles of government. They bore much of the brunt of the late war. The restoration of Europe to its former place in world affairs depends very largely on their ability to repair extensive war damage and to maintain their independence in the meantime—tasks they will be unable to accomplish without economic assistance and certain essential armaments. These nations form the core of any feasible plan for collective security and world unity. Undoubtedly they believe in the Atlantic Pact as the most practical means thus far devised of achieving a measure of security in an insecure world and of making headway toward the objectives outlined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Beginning in July 1948, when the Committee of Ambassadors of the Western Union states began to work out a draft treaty with the coöperation of the U. S. Department of State, there was a good deal of discussion as to the logical limits of membership in the alliance. An enlarged group of states might represent greater weight and prestige, but the more numerous the component parts the greater would be the likelihood of internal disagreements and weakened common purpose. Other factors that had to be taken into consideration in seeking proper limits for the association were strategic location, relative defensibility, proximity to the Soviet Union, economic potentialities, military strength, and—not least—the character of political institutions. Unless the proposed alliance could represent a league of free peoples, one of its principal moral elements of strength would be sacrificed.

Denmark

The Danes, being like the Norse an Atlantic people, were responsive to similar impulses. Having for a brief period based some hopes on a Scandinavian pact, Danish political leaders had become convinced by March 1949 of the futility of such a grouping as a defense measure in substitution for membership in the Atlantic Pact.

On March 11th the Danish Foreign Minister, Gustav Rasmussen, arrived in Washington to discuss "the implications of the Pact as far as Denmark is concerned." A principal question which arose in this connection had to do with the continued use of Greenland, a Danish possession, by United States air forces. In 1941, while Denmark was in the hands of German forces of occupation, Secretary of State Hull negotiated with the Danish Ministry an agreement to permit construction of fortified air bases on the island. In 1946 negotiations were begun in a desultory fashion looking toward either the re-negotiation of the wartime agreement or the return of the bases to Denmark. Partly because the continued use of the Greenland bases might be interpreted by the Soviet authorities as a hostile move, it was agreed, prior to Denmark's entry into the Atlantic Pact, that the United States would return all war time bases.

Sweden

As has been indicated, Sweden made no move toward joining the North Atlantic Alliance. The Swedes had found a neutral status in two world wars extremely profitable and have hoped to be able to continue without molestation by walking softly in the international field. This course is the more logical because Sweden is geographically isolated from the Atlantic area and is situated in such close proximity to Russia as to justify a large measure of caution in foreign policy. In view of the experience of Finland in 1939 and that of Norway in 1940, Sweden has realized that there is small reason to feel assured that a policy of neutrality alone will be a barrier to aggression. Consequently, being an industrialized country, Sweden has determined to employ all of its available resources toward remaining independently strong. Nevertheless, despite a modern air force and a well-trained army, comprising a tithe of the population, it is likely that Soviet forces could overrun and occupy the whole-country in a matter of a few days.

In the summer of 1948 the Swedish Government arrived at a for-

mula for reinforcing its defense establishment while still avoiding any overt cause of provocation to the Soviet Union. As a safe median course between Western Union or an Atlantic Pact and a treaty bond with the U.S.S.R., Sweden proposed to Norway and Denmark the formation of a tripartite alliance on the basis of mutual military assistance. In the expressed willingness of Sweden to render immediate armed aid to the Danes or Norwegians in case of attack from any quarter—a new departure in Swedish foreign policy—can be found a guide to the apprehension with which the Swedes view their future in a technological age. On careful study, it has become clear to them, as it has to their Norse and Danish neighbors, that in any future general conflict they are condemned, by the logic of their geographic position and without regard to their national and foreign policies, to suffer some involvement. That their resources will prove to be weak on the day of attack by a major power or power association is beyond doubt. It was the realization that the combined strength of the Scandinavian states would be trifling in the face of external dangers that had much to do with the eschewing of a Scandinavian alliance by Denmark and Norway.

The Swedes have not, of course, been unmoved by these considerations, particularly since, they—like their neighbors to the west—have been in need of certain types of armament obtainable only from the United States at the present time. For this reason, a small but active minority in Sweden has favored adherence to the Atlantic Pact. Historically, institutionally, and ideologically, the Swedes would be predisposed to favor association with the western nations. However, even if other factors were not sufficiently impelling, Sweden's dependence on coal from Poland is such as to make very remote the likelihood that the former will make any overtures for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

Iceland

From the outset, Iceland was actively interested in the North Atlantic Alliance. In the air age, this small republic of 100,000 souls, a possession of Denmark for centuries prior to 1918, occupies an exposed and particularly strategic position almost midway between two great continental land masses. Without powerful external support it would be helpless militarily.

Upon the German invasion of Denmark at the beginning of World War II, Iceland established an independent government and came

voluntarily under British protection for a period. After the United States became a belligerent, Iceland was garrisoned by United States forces, but these were withdrawn promptly upon the termination of the German threat in the North Atlantic. This experience left the Icelanders confident of American good faith and strongly disposed to look to the United States for protection in future. Finding that its determination to grant no concessions for military bases in time of peace to members of the North Atlantic Alliance would be no obstacle to membership, the Icelandic Government indicated a clear desire to be included in the Atlantic Pact. Representatives of that state participated in the concluding series of discussions in Washington and Iceland became one of the original signatories of the Pact.

Italy

The question as to the place of the "new Italy" in the European family of nations was given consideration during the formative stages of Western Union. In his significant address of January 22, 1948, Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin envisaged the eventual inclusion of Italy in any general scheme of European union.⁴ During the earlier discussions on the Atlantic Pact there appeared to be a disposition on the part of Great Britain and France to favor the postponement of any consideration of Italy as a pact member for these reasons: (1) Italy could not as yet be regarded as a reconstructed state or one capable of pursuing a consistent foreign policy; (2) only by treating the Mediterranean as a mere extension of the Atlantic Ocean could Italy be included appropriately in a North Atlantic grouping; (3) Italy would be quite as likely to bring weakness as strength to the North Atlantic group, especially in view of its large communist element; and (4) in any case, it was not a member of the United Nations.

However, the American Department of State seems to have looked with favor on the inclusion of Italy in the North Atlantic system at the outset, possibly with a view to strengthening the non-communist elements. On investigation, there appeared to be no formal barrier to the inclusion of Italy on the ground of non-membership in the United Nations. Articles 51 and 52 of the U. N. Charter, which are the legal foundations for regional security arrangements, do not specifically prohibit member states from entering into regional relationships with non-member states. Moreover, Article 52 of the Charter specifically states that "This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35". Article 35 stipulates that "A state which is not a member

of United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter." These "obligations of pacific settlement," enumerated in Article 33 of the Charter, include, among others, "*resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.*" In view of these provisions and in the absence of any prohibition, there appeared to be no obstacle to the joining of members and non-members of the United Nations in regional pacts in which the spirit of the Charter would not be contravened.

Although now a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, Italy did not attain that status without difficulty. While the largest of the Italian political parties in the coalition government, the Christian Democrats, had favored the pact from an early date, their co-workers, the Democratic Socialists, were opposed to the idea, while the Communists resorted to every means and stratagem to obstruct the way. Violent protest demonstrations were held in many cities, filibustering tactics were employed in the Chamber of Deputies, and various forms of intimidation were used in vain. Proponents of the pact won by decisive votes in the end and Count Carlo Sforza, who had survived many diplomatic vicissitudes in his time, could take obvious pride in signing the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of Italy.

Portugal

Portugal, one of the Marshall Plan countries not a member of the United Nations, posed other problems. Being essentially a modified dictatorship in which the government does not operate clearly on the principle of a rule of law by consent of the governed, its inclusion in an association of "free" peoples would tend to mar the consistency of the pact and to weaken its moral influence.

These difficulties were fully recognized by the authors of the pact. They believed, however, that the disadvantages were outweighed by other considerations, such as the desirability of preserving a large measure of identity between the members of the pact and those benefiting under the Marshall Plan, and the importance of the geographical position occupied by Portugal. Although the Portuguese Government made clear its unwillingness to provide arms bases to pact members in peace-time, the United States and Great Britain in particular could not be oblivious of the extent to which the Azores, Portuguese

possessions lying well out in the Atlantic, would be an important factor in the North Atlantic defense system if made available as sea and air bases in time of war.

Spain

While Portugal thus proceeded to enter the North Atlantic Alliance, Spain remained outside. Although geographically a part of the area defined by the pact, Spain, the principal remaining fascist state in Europe, could hardly be invited to membership. If there had been doubt as to the propriety of the inclusion of Portugal, there was none in this instance, even though dictator Franco delicately indicated his wish to be included as an equal in the North Atlantic community and was not without apologists even in the United States.

Spain's candidacy was most ardently supported by Portugal. It was not unnatural that the physical contact with Spain along the whole of Portugal's land frontier had much to do with the statement issued by the Portuguese Embassy in Washington in March 1949, setting forth arguments in favor of the inclusion of Spain in the proposed alliance. This, however, was to no avail. When it became unmistakably clear that Spain would not be found among the original signatories of the treaty, Portugal looked to its own defenses by obtaining from the Spanish Government an assurance that the latter would not regard Portuguese membership in the Atlantic Pact as conflicting with the Hispano-Portuguese non-aggression treaty of 1940.

Franco, meanwhile, has displayed no chagrin at his exclusion from the pact. Having issued a statement that in any circumstances Spain will give aid and support to Portugal in the event of war, he continues apparently to entertain fond hopes that the passage of time and the exigencies of European politics will yet make the inclusion of Spain in the North Atlantic group an essential matter.

Germany

The relationship of Germany to the pact poses one of the most complicated questions of all owing to its size, population, geographical location, and, most important of all, its industrial potential. Without the aid of Germany there can hardly be a full economic recovery of Western Europe. By the same token, the future of Germany is of great consequence to Eastern Europe. The principal elements in the German problem are these:

1. Germany is divided between two ideologic worlds. The line between East and West passes through the heart of that country and bids

fair to remain there for an indefinite period. Even Berlin is a divided city and although the Germans in the Soviet areas have given unmistakable evidence of their wish to be united with the West under the type of controls obtaining there, no prospect exists that a union will take place until major changes occur in the present world order.

2. Even though a constitution has been adopted and a government is in operation on democratic principles in Western Germany, combining the British, French and American zones, it will be long before the new German state, even if it proves durable, will have earned the privilege of being accepted into the European family of nations. Prejudices and fears in the surrounding western states are deeply grounded and it will be years before these can be reduced to the point of facilitating true international coöperation. The obvious hope of the Soviet Union that the whole of Germany can yet be brought into the Soviet system may or may not have a bearing on the immediate period of transition, but it promises to remain an ever-present factor.

3. Germany must be taken largely into account in the carrying out of any scheme of Western European defense. Without the wise use of raw materials and the manufacturing skills of that country the convalescence of Western Europe may never be complete. The North Atlantic Alliance has great need of Germany.

Can or should the Germans be re-armed in their own defense and for the strengthening of the Atlantic Pact? In such event, could pact members count on German support in time of emergency? Meanwhile, may not the holding of the new German state under external controls build up a predisposition toward the enticements of Soviet Russia? There is no satisfactory answer to these and related questions. But it is not too much to suggest that the future of Europe and possibly the hope for peace in our time will depend to a very considerable extent on the future of Germany.

1. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance," in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 3 (April 1949), pp. 369-378.

2. A good summary is contained in the Brookings Institution, *Current Developments in United States Foreign Policy*, vol. 2, no. 7 (February 1949), pp. 14-16.

3. See Department of State White Paper of March 19, 1949: "Participants in Alliance."

4. Boyd, *Western Union*, pp. 60-61.

5. Department of State, White Paper on *The North Atlantic Pact*, p. 4; cf. Article 10 of the treaty.

VII

Soviet Attitude Toward the Pact

As negotiations progressed toward agreement on the character of the North Atlantic Alliance and the form of the treaty, the world was left in little doubt as to the reaction of the Soviet Union. Communist elements in each of the prospective member states, particularly in France and Italy, gave voice to their opposition in most vigorous terms. Direct approaches were made to Norway, Denmark, and even Turkey, suggesting closer relations with the Soviet system and not too subtly warning against adhering to the Atlantic Pact. The U.S.S.R. also openly opposed a defense union among the Scandinavian states. Early in March 1949, announcement was made in Moscow that the Soviet Government expected to spend approximately 20% more on its armed forces in that year than it had during the previous year. Major shifts in personnel in top Soviet posts at about the same time appeared to be not unrelated to Atlantic Alliance developments.

The Soviet View of Western Union

From the time the pact gave promise of materializing, Soviet spokesmen attacked it as merely an enlargement of Western Union and as inconsistent with existing treaties, particularly those which created wartime alliances between France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. Attention was drawn to Article 7 of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance and Article 5 of the Franco-Soviet Alliance: "The high contracting parties undertake not to conclude any alliance or to take part in any coalition directed against one of the high contracting powers."¹ Since the Atlantic Pact clearly is directed against the Soviet Union, said the Communists, Great Britain and France were placing themselves in the position of violators of solemn engagements.

A statement issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 29, 1949, aimed principally at the emerging Atlantic Pact, contained exceedingly bitter denunciations of the Brussels alliance.² The statement declared, in part:

"It is easy to see that the establishment of this alliance means that the Governments of Great Britain, France and the other participant

countries have finally abandoned the policy that was pursued by the democratic states which were members of the anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War, and which aimed at consolidating the forces of all peace-loving states . . .”

Great Britain and France, the statement continued, “have embarked upon a new policy . . . with the purpose of establishing their domination over other nations in Europe, not stopping at employing for these ends yesterday’s aggressor”, *i.e.*, Western Germany.

Denunciation of the Atlantic Alliance

Having attacked the “anti-democratic and reactionary aggressive nature of Western Union”, and having asserted that the Marshall Plan “is not aimed at a genuine economic revival of the European states, but serves as a means of adjusting the policy and economy of the ‘Marshallized’ countries to the narrow, self-seeking and strategic-military plans for Anglo-American domination of Europe”, the Soviet statement of January 29th proceeded to pay tribute to the Atlantic Pact at some length:

“The incompatibility of such political plans of the Anglo-American bloc with concern for peace and with the realization of the principles of democracy in the European countries is perfectly clear . . .

“The faster and farther the countries of the Western Union move along the path of opposing the countries of people’s democracy and the Soviet Union—a path to which they are being persistently pushed by the policy of the Anglo-American bloc—the more the West European Powers will become politically and economically dependent on the ruling circles of the United States, who are not in the least bit concerned about the political and economic rebirth of the European states. . . . The North Atlantic Pact is by no means required for self-defense, but for the realization of the policy of aggression, for effecting the policy of unleashing a new war.”

Most of these charges were reiterated in the Soviet press after the publication of the treaty text. There were other indications, also, of an unhappy reaction to the challenge of the West in preparations for creating in Eastern Germany a separate Soviet-controlled nation and in a peremptory warning (March 21) to Finland against aligning itself with the Western powers.

Refutation of Soviet Charges

These denunciations came with poor grace from the state that had been obstructing much of the work of the Security Council of the

United Nations by an uninhibited use of the veto, that had refused to coöperate in solving the problems of atomic energy control, that had blockaded Berlin, that had sponsored the rape of Czechoslovakia, and that had been instrumental in creating a group of communist dictatorships in neighboring states. As a propaganda line, however, it may have been useful to attempt to put the Western powers on the defensive by accusing them repeatedly of imperialistic designs and acts at a time when Russian authority was being pushed to its extreme limits in every direction.

It appeared to have little effect on the line of Russian argument that charges of "imperialism" and "war-mongering" were refuted repeatedly and on indisputably solid grounds by spokesmen of the United States and by representatives of other treaty nations. At every step in the development of the Atlantic Pact the negotiators had emphasized the fact that it is not directed against any state but only against aggression from any quarter.

Immediately after the publication of the draft treaty, the U. S. Department of State issued an explanatory White Paper³ which replied to Soviet accusations in direct and blunt terms. This statement said in part:

"The expectation that the coöperation among the great powers pledged during the war and reflected in the [U. N.] Charter would be continued has not been realized . . .

"Since the signing of the Charter it has become progressively clearer that serious misconceptions prevail in the minds of the leaders of the Soviet Union concerning Western civilization and concerning what is possible and what is impossible in the relations between the Soviet Union and the world at large. . . .

"In the field of international relations efforts of the western powers to reach agreements providing genuine solutions for many of the most important postwar problems have thus far proved fruitless because of Soviet intransigence. Nonetheless, the Parties to the North Atlantic Pact solemnly and specifically reaffirm their obligation under the Charter to settle any international dispute by peaceful means and in such a manner that peace, security, and justice are not endangered."

Continued Soviet Intransigence

The Soviet Government was not in the least embarrassed by such statements. When the exact terms of the pact became known, it summed up its interpretation of them by insisting: (1) that the North Atlantic Treaty had nothing in common with the purpose of self-defense of the

states party to the treaty, since these states were being threatened by no one; (2) that the treaty, far from contributing to the consolidation of peace and international security, actually ran counter to the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter; (3) that the treaty tended to negate the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet treaties of alliance; and (4) that the pact was contrary to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.

In the face of such broad and sweeping assertions, repeated in substance in Andrei Gromyko's diatribes at Lake Success after the signing of the pact, there appeared to be little prospect that any basis of agreement with respect to the alliance itself or with respect to the circumstances which had produced the alliance was likely to be reached in the foreseeable future. In fact, there could be little doubt that the alliance would have the effect of widening the breach between the Soviet system and the West which first appeared as an ominous crack with the partitioning of Germany into separately controlled zones. That there would be a repeated testing of the innate strength of the alliance in one way or another was a foregone conclusion.

The Pact and Eastern Europe

There was no novelty in the echoes that rebounded from the communist-dominated states in Central and Eastern Europe upon the signing of the Atlantic Pact. This was inevitable since variance from the Moscow line could not be expected or even remotely tolerated by Soviet Russia. From Warsaw, from Prague, from Bucharest came the same theme: the Atlantic Pact was a threat to the cause of peace and contradictory to the spirit and the letter of the United Nations Charter; it was not a defensive pact, as the clauses providing for military preparedness and action proved; the signatories intended that it should serve imperialistic purposes. Only in dissident Yugoslavia could be found a variant note, which indicated only that Marshal Tito's situation was anomalous.

The Paris Conference of Ministers

It was in an international atmosphere of this kind that the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States met in Paris at the end of May, 1949, to consider the German problem. Probably no high hopes of real accomplishment were entertained in advance by many of the participants, since no grounds for optimism existed. The event justified gloomy expectations at best. Little of consequence was achieved either of a tangible or an

intangible nature. In such circumstances the Atlantic Pact inevitably grew in meaning.

1. The full texts of these treaties are given in Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, no. 4 (July 1948), pp. 227-28, 230.
2. Excerpts from this lengthy statement are given in Appendix 9. The full text is contained in *U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin*, February 11, 1949, pp. 79-87.
3. Department of State, White Paper on *The North Atlantic Pact*.

VIII

Separate Regional Situations

A number of the factors favoring the North Atlantic Alliance may well serve as arguments for other regional pacts.

The Atlantic Pact loses some of its meaning unless it is considered as an instrument of a policy of containment. Material aid has been extended to Greece and Turkey on the basis of the containment principle. If this concept is sound as a means of counteracting additional communist aggression, it is manifest that the "ring fence" is incomplete while the Soviet bloc has access to the Adriatic, could readily penetrate to the Aegean Sea or to the Indian Ocean, and controls long reaches of the shores of the western Pacific. This situation has given rise to several fairly serious proposals for other regional defense arrangements.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

One question which arises in this connection very naturally relates to the position of the British Commonwealth under the Atlantic Pact. Great Britain and Canada, two of the leading members of this group, were original signatories of the treaty. They are the only members of the Commonwealth within the defined geographical limits of the alliance. Do the other members acquire any assurances, perhaps as associate members, or are they to shift for themselves? Will Great Britain have their interests at heart, as formerly, outside of the pact? Is the North Atlantic Alliance evidence that the British Commonwealth can no longer be self-sufficing as a security system? Has it been superseded? In the event of external dangers which they are unable to meet alone, must the members of the Commonwealth lying outside of the North Atlantic area rely on the faint hope that the U. N. Security Council can find means equal to the situation? These and related questions are not susceptible of easy solution.

Variations in Character and Outlook

The British Commonwealth of Nations is a world organization. Its members represent almost every major part of the globe. They vary in origin, in size, in population, in economic life and in culture.

Considering Pakistan, India and Ceylon as members of the system, many other differences and contrasts might be noted. Relationships between and among the members of the Commonwealth are the more difficult to define because they consist so largely of immaterial ties. Even the processes by which the Commonwealth lives and has its being are difficult to describe. But there can be no doubt that this strange association possesses reality and vigor and promise for the future. Certainly there is no reason to believe that the ties between Great Britain and members of the Commonwealth beyond the North Atlantic have been weakened by the pact, or, indeed, that they have been largely affected at all, except insofar as the treaty may prove to be a source of strength to the "home" country. The point is that the pact, except for Great Britain and Canada, does not purport to take into consideration the peculiar external problems, actual or potential, of the outlying members of the world group. To some this is a matter of regret; to others it is quite incidental.

Importance of Lines of Communication

Both Pakistan and India have displayed small interest in the pact. Their apparent problems do not lie in the North Atlantic area and their ties with other members of the association are relatively weak. Australia and New Zealand, on the other hand, are deeply interested in the Atlantic grouping, the more so because they readily appreciate the fact that the lines of communication which in past times of stress have been lines of succor—*i.e.*, those passing through the Mediterranean or those running via the Cape route and the Panama Canal—cannot be made secure by Great Britain as in former times. The concern of Australia and New Zealand is shared by Ceylon and, to a lesser degree, by South Africa.

The Southwest Pacific

Proposals for a Southwest Pacific grouping reached a preliminary planning stage in the early months of 1949. On March 14 representatives of Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia opened defense talks at Canberra, presumably with the thought of further extending the idea which was then taking shape in the North Atlantic Alliance. At that time, however, the view was taken in London that plans for a Pacific defense pact were premature and consultations were broken off, although British authorities did admit to having given considerable study to the possibility of providing for the defense of the Commonwealth through a series of regional alliances.

All members of the Commonwealth are conscious of the fact that the world is now one geographically and that only in a universal system is there security for all. If this can be accomplished exclusively in terms of regional pacts, most of them would elect to have the Atlantic Pact supplemented by other regional groupings. Otherwise, they must dwell in hope that the added strength which the United Nations derives from the Atlantic Pact may enable the U. N. to provide for the defense of every member of the Commonwealth.

Canada

Canada, of course, is conscious of occupying a peculiarly strategic and possibly a dangerous position. Most of its comparatively small population of twelve millions plus is confined by the attraction of the greater nation to the south and by the pressure of polar climate in the north to a long and narrow band adjoining the boundary of the United States from sea to sea. Yet it has long reaches of coast line to defend both on the east and the west and now, as a result of the pact, its unsurveyed boundary in the north. Since its defense arrangements must needs be coordinated with those of the United States, it was with unfeigned enthusiasm that Canadian officials assisted in bringing the project for a North Atlantic Alliance to consummation. The publication of the terms of the pact was received by Canadians with deep satisfaction for very obvious reasons.

The Mediterranean Area

Considerations of a rather more immanent nature than those relating to the British Commonwealth of Nations have led to proposals for a Mediterranean pact. From the strategic point of view, the Mediterranean may be quite as important to the defense of Western Europe as portions of the Atlantic area. While the Atlantic Pact might hamper a further westward thrust by the U.S.S.R., it would not, taking it literally, necessarily stand in the way of a flanking movement through the Mediterranean either toward the Atlantic, or into North Africa, or toward the oil-producing areas of the Middle East.

Such possibilities have given rise to proposals from Greece, Turkey, and Egypt—each of which regards itself as occupying an exposed position—for a Mediterranean pact of which the United States would be either a guarantor or an essential member. Parts of the Mediterranean area are, of course, specifically included in the North Atlantic Alliance. France, with Algeria, carries approximately as much weight in the Mediterranean as in the Atlantic; Italy, bounded on the north by the

Alps, is almost wholly Mediterranean. A Mediterranean alignment, however, would have to assume a form different from the North Atlantic Alliance. Its architects would certainly have to include the whole of French North Africa with the thought that, in the event of a third world war, Africa would figure more importantly than at any time previously as a defensive base for the "free" nations. French North Africa could be expected to offer assets in terms of ready military, naval and air bases and even some manpower and supplies. Great Britain would be an essential member because of traditional relations with parts of the area, particularly Turkey and Egypt, because of continuing concern for the Mediterranean-Red Sea route, a principal tie in Commonwealth relationships, and because of the strong points still in British possession—Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, the Suez Canal and, for the time being, Cyrenaica.

The Middle East

However, the states of the Near and Middle East, including those from whom overtures have come, present a congeries of special problems. Greece, a unique problem unto itself, already has been accorded special treatment. Turkey, for all practical purposes, has been given its separate assurances. But aside from hostility toward Israel, the essential weaknesses and the internal difficulties of the Islamic states present a strong deterrent to firm guarantees by western powers.

It is true that the Middle Eastern states—including those lying well beyond the shores of the Mediterranean—occupy positions of increasing importance in the air age (partly because of immense oil reserves) and cannot be entirely left out of consideration in any plans envisaging global security. It is quite probable also that a Mediterranean security pact, if at all practicable and in which the component states would assume very substantial shares of responsibility for the common defense, would come as a partial relief to the United States, which has found the commitments to Greece and Turkey a very appreciable burden.

The additional risks involved in new treaty guarantees to the states of the area, however, would be considerable and they do not appear to be warranted. It is perfectly clear without spelling out the fact in other formal treaty commitments that the United States recognizes the importance, economically, politically, and strategically, of the Mediterranean area and that it may be counted upon to take appropriate action, in the event of serious aggression toward any part of the area, as readily without a regional pact as under any other circumstances. The Atlantic Treaty may be taken as bond for the deed and it is not likely

to be misinterpreted by potential aggressors. It appears unlikely that a separate Mediterranean pact will be thought necessary by the powers whose participation would be vital to its useful functioning.

By the same token, it is not clear that other regional security pacts would improve the world situation at this period. The situation in the Far East would not seem to be susceptible of improvement by a regional treaty of alliance. In fact, a Far East pact under existing circumstances would appear to have even less virtue than one for the Middle East or the Mediterranean. All of the Americas and, theoretically, all of Europe are provided for in the Rio and Atlantic Pacts. Inasmuch as both of these regional associations are essentially extensions of the United Nations Charter, experience may yet demonstrate that by these means the Charter has been implemented sufficiently to enable progress to continue toward the goal of a general system of security.

IX

Types of Problem Areas

Nations that possess free and democratic institutions and desire to live at peace are placed at some disadvantage in the world as compared with totalitarian states whose rulers or leaders, concerned with their own power and prestige, generally are not scrupulous as to the methods by which their ends are attained. Too frequently in a disunited states system, the initiative, a considerable advantage in itself, is held by those who would least hesitate to employ it in the use of force for materialistic reasons. The forming of defensive pacts by states apprehensive of aggression does not alone compensate for the disadvantage. In countless instances it has been shown that only a superior will by free peoples to preserve their freedom and a readiness to make any sacrifice in that cause balances the scale of relative advantage. But the determination of democratic peoples to preserve their institutions depends in large measure on the health of their political and social life and on the extent to which, being free and individualistic, they are willing and able to act in coöperation and to serve a common cause. The freedom of the individual and the peculiar characteristics of the free nation can be, and not infrequently in the past have been, carried to unfortunate extremes.

The Nature of Security Problems

The security problems that have given rise to the North Atlantic Alliance exemplify these general truths. They arise in large part because the blueprint for the post-war world, the United Nations Charter—so admirable in so many ways—failed sufficiently to take into consideration the fact that the defeat of nazism and fascism in World War II did not eliminate all of the powerful forces arrayed at large against the principle of government of, by, and for the governed. The United Nations was brought into existence with the idea that the coöperation which was achieved by the great powers during the war and which was reflected still in the drawing up of the Charter would continue on through the period of trial and adjustment and post-war development.

The United Nations was designed to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of peace over a long period of time through common action of the nations in solving political, economic, social and cultural problems. Machinery was set up for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. Even rudimentary means of enforcement were outlined in the Charter, but it was thought dangerous or inexpedient to have these means apply to the major powers—those in whose hands all power of enforcement lay. Most unfortunately, the concert of the powers produced only discords. The confidence of the world, so high in the summer of 1945, dwindled rapidly thereafter and in the unhealthy atmosphere of distrust and despair the seeds sown by militant communism sprouted and flourished mightily.

The circumstances which brought forth the Atlantic Pact indicated a real need for bringing the alliance into effect at the earliest moment practicable. Clearly, there was no time for making an exhaustive study of many of the details implicit in the treaty before action upon it was taken by the governments directly concerned. A good many questions to which the pact inevitably would give rise obviously would have to find answers in the course of actual experience. Some of them probably would test the strength of the pact and bring into relief the shortcomings of the parental United Nations Charter. Yet there could be no doubt in the minds of those on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean whose coöperative effort has borne fruit in the North Atlantic Alliance that, whatever imperfections the treaty might contain and whatever difficulties might be encountered in its application, no other way of meeting the international emergency is more likely to be effectual. That no alternative was to be found in reasoned understanding or compromise with the Soviet Union was all too painfully evident.

Practical Problems to be Met

Recognition of some of the practical problems which are being and will be encountered in the carrying out of the terms of the alliance will be a long step in the direction of sound solutions. The intelligence and persistence with which these problems are examined may well be a measure of the likelihood of the success of the pact and, ultimately, the success of the United Nations. The questions which follow are certainly deserving of careful consideration.

Political and Military Questions

Those who drafted the treaty undoubtedly were chiefly concerned with political and military considerations, but they did not overlook

other values in calculating the chances of success. Is the chief virtue of the treaty to be found in its military potentialities? Or is its importance primarily psychological, as some others are inclined to think? These lead to other vital questions.

Can security against threats of aggression be achieved by military means alone? Will potential aggressors be deterred from their purposes by the prospect of being opposed by a few army divisions which might not be available at the scene of action until the aggressive stroke has been driven home?

May not the emphasis laid on armaments provoke an arms race in which resources, which otherwise might be applied to economic recovery, will be diverted to military, naval and air establishments, thus contributing in the long run to a growing weakness instead of an increasing strength of pact members?

Is there basis for the fear of some that the very existence of the pact may tend to induce in the minds of the American people, if not also in the minds of those of the European member states, a false sense of security—a kind of “Maginot Line” complex? This could result in lack of wariness and in a false confidence which itself might prove to be a source of weakness in view of the likelihood that the pact will have very little effect on the character of the long-range aims of the Soviet Union. Should this argument carry much weight if it is true that little or no collective security can be provided by the United Nations in the Western European area without such implementation as the pact provides? Will the pact, in any case, tend to dilute the growing sentiment for a Western European federation which in the end might have more virtue, as a defense mechanism, than the North Atlantic Alliance?

Since the Atlantic Pact makes provision for collective action only in case of external aggression toward one or more of its members, what would result in case of internal revolution in one or more of the member states? Should the Communists in France or Italy seize the power of the state, as conceivably might happen, what would be the virtue of the pact in such an emergency? Might not the armaments and other aid as have been supplied to such members states actually be employed against other members of the Atlantic Alliance, including the United States?

If “A Lend-Lease program of arms and equipment amounting, over a four or five-year period, to perhaps \$15 billion to \$18 billion, is one of the duties expected of the United States when the alliance has been completed,”¹ will this mean a further depletion of raw materials and a continued drain upon production in an era of high taxes and grow-

ing needs in the way of housing, education, etc.? When conscious popular needs are not met for the sake of extensive grants to countries abroad, are more Americans likely to listen to communist propaganda?

The Pact and the United Nations

Will the pact be a source of strength or of weakness to the United Nations?

Is the existence of the treaty an admission of the partial failure of the United Nations or, on the contrary, a partial implementation of its provisions, considering the alliance has been effected within the framework of the U. N. Charter? Once machinery for regional defense has been created, may not members of this regional group be inclined to disregard U. N. Charter provisions and fail to report to the Security Council the measures they have taken for self-defense, thus giving the United Nations the go-by?

May this not be the beginning of a process of substituting for a general system of collective security a series of regional pacts which, however technically related to the Charter, will represent a return to power politics and tend to destroy rather than to build up a global co-operative scheme?

Will the pact tend to crystallize the present viscous world into two hostile power groups and make infinitely more difficult any moves which might possibly alleviate friction between the Soviet system and the democracies? If this is true will not the treaty provide only the *illusion* of security?

Mutual Relations of Pact Members

Since each member of the pact is free, to all intents and purposes, to place its own interpretation on acts that conceivably might be construed as aggressive, disagreement among members might result in numerous "border-line" instances. Would such disagreements tend to nullify the treaty? What provisions are made or to be made for determining such moot questions?

Will the proposed council of the pact members have any but advisory functions? Must decisions as to action to be taken by the alliance be unanimous? Can any member of the pact veto in effect the decisions of the others?

The Rio Pact spells out in detail the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the Inter-American system, but the Atlantic Pact contains only a very general commitment that the members will settle their disputes by peaceful means. Is there any sig-

nificance in this variance? What would be the position of the United States under the pact in the event of an aggressive action against another treaty member by a state which clearly had been provoked to such action?

The Question of Germany

The relationship of Germany to the North Atlantic Alliance has been touched upon. The question still remains as to whether a Western Germany, rehabilitated and ostensibly reorientated by members of the alliance, ever would be considered eligible for inclusion in the pact and, if so, under what conditions.

Would it be practicable, in any case, for the alliance to re-arm Western Germany as an outpost of the defense system?

Would members of the pact not in occupation of German territory find themselves in any changed relationship *vis-a-vis* Germany and German problems in consequence of the pact, particularly if the alliance should come to be regarded as a step toward European union?

Colonial Questions

How will the Atlantic Pact affect the position of the colonial powers of Western Europe with reference to their holdings in Asia and Africa?²

In underwriting the security and economic recovery of the associated European states, would the United States be regarded as insuring also the *status quo*, either as to safety from external dangers or as to existing types of control—for example, in Indonesia on the part of the Netherlands, in Indo-China on the part of France, or in Malaya on the part of Great Britain?

The Department of State has asserted that under the pact the United States will not be committed to supporting colonial policies of other governments. Is it not true, however, that in order to make sure of the security of member states, the United States, whether bound by treaty or not, in effect has underwritten almost any major policy of its allies, even if such a policy should prove to have some imperialistic qualities of its own?

The Pact and European Integration

Integration among the free nations of Europe is proceeding step by step in the economic and military fields. What will be the effect of the Atlantic Pact on this process? Can any conclusions be drawn from the fact that the members of Western Union were planning and engaging

in joint military maneuvers, with a certain amount of American co-operation, before the Atlantic Pact had become operative?³

What assurances has the United States received that European pact members will integrate their policies to the extent required for the successful operation of allied defense arrangements?

These and many other comparable questions inevitably are bound up in an alliance as meaningful as the Atlantic Pact. They will bring home to American citizens a host of problems, touching European interests—which now are American interests also, directly or indirectly—in nearly every part of the world. But the problem areas touched upon in this chapter do not include some of the most difficult and essential questions of all—those having to do with ways and means of implementing the pact. Since any consequences which may flow from the Atlantic Pact will be owing largely to the material substance it may come to possess, the implementing of the treaty as a problem requiring special consideration.

1. Hanson W. Baldwin in *New York Times*, December 5, 1948.

2. See Vera Micheles Dean, "Pros and Cons of North Atlantic Defense Pact," in *Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. 24, no. 19 (Feb. 15, 1949), p. 232.

3. See George Fielding Eliot, "Military Organization under The Atlantic Pact", in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 27, no. 4 (July, 1949), pp. 640-650.

X

Implementation of the Pact

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that "in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." This is a particularly euphemistic way of indicating the fact that the powers entering into alliance were painfully aware of their weaknesses with respect to armaments and realized that it would be necessary to employ every resource to develop their physical ability to resist aggression.

Nature of the Defense Problem

No details which might have been added to the simple statement contained in the treaty could easily have exaggerated the complete unreadiness of the allies for the most elementary test of strength in self-defense. Several of the members of the Atlantic Pact never had undertaken to maintain important military establishments. Those that once had been strong—Great Britain and France, in particular—had emerged from World War II with few resources remaining. France, when freed from German occupation, was destitute of troops, arms, and even armament industries. Great Britain, in a state of near bankruptcy, could no longer afford to keep large military forces in being. The smaller European countries, except for Portugal, which has no military pretensions, were war-ravaged and helpless. Even the United States at the close of the late war had reduced its military forces to a point of relative insignificance. But only the United States has the means—in terms of wealth, resources, industry and surplus war materials—to assist largely with any program of re-armament, either of Western Europe or of itself. Considering the feebleness of the Atlantic powers and increasing danger from an armed and aggressive totalitarian bloc, a North Atlantic Alliance without provisions for the building up and possible use of armaments would be pointless. The whole treaty depends substantially on Article 3.

Strategists differ as to where the eastern frontier of the United

States now lies. The conservative would place it at the Rhine. Others insist that it must incorporate Western Germany and hence should extend to the Elbe. Still others would place it at the Oder. All would agree, however, that it is situated well within the European continent and that, without reference to the Atlantic Pact, the United States must take note of all matters of a political and military nature to the westward of Central Europe.

Consequently, in making provision for its own defense in an insecure world, the United States cannot avoid being gravely concerned over the state of military preparedness in the whole of Western Europe. In this circumstance lies much of the logic of the North Atlantic Alliance. Acting in its own interest, the United States would have been compelled, in any event, to assume a considerable measure of responsibility for the rearmament of the states of Western Europe. It was their pleas for arms and funds for armaments that led in the first place to the serious consideration by the United States of the virtues of an alliance.

Judging from many kinds of evidence, the American people are no longer unwilling that this country should enter, in time of peace, into a treaty arrangement with nations outside of the Western Hemisphere, even though, under certain circumstances, this might involve a moral obligation to resort to armed force. At the same time, there clearly is no rejoicing at the prospect that the implementing of the Atlantic Pact may add heavily to a tax burden already bearing down on a high standard of living. Even though the treaty lays emphasis on "effective self-help" of members of the alliance, it is a foregone conclusion that the cost of a large share of the rearmament program must be borne by the nation which volunteered at the opening of World War II to be the "arsenal of democracy." The fact that the North Atlantic Alliance has been well received at all, considering that it might result in a state of war and that meanwhile it is not known what price must be paid for aid in the rearmament of member states, can only mean that the majority of Americans now are aware of the extent to which a policy of isolation has become unrealistic.

The Arms Program

As a legislative matter, the arms program for the Atlantic Pact was kept distinct from the question of approval of the treaty itself. Nevertheless, in view of the character of the emergency, draft legislation for the appropriation of funds with which partially to implement the treaty was prepared and publicly announced before the pact had been

acted upon by the Senate and before any over-all plan of defense for the alliance existed. In presenting the draft legislation, the Department of State made clear that, in view of the potential dangers to which European members of the alliance were exposed and the need for improving their morale as an aid to economic recovery, a grant of funds and equipment was needed at an early date. It was pointed out that such action would be looked upon as an earnest of the serious purpose of the United States in entering the alliance and furthermore that the funds requested—\$1,130,000,000 for the first year (in addition to the sum of \$320,000,000 for aid under the Truman Plan to Greece and Turkey)—would be small in comparison with the over-all United States defense budget of \$15,000,000,000 for the same period.¹

Spokesmen for the Department of State pointed out further that as much as 40% of the proposed initial grant would be supplied in terms of surplus arms and equipment—at about 10% of the original cost of manufacture—which would have a two-fold virtue. It would reduce the actual cash outlay in dollars while giving the allies more immediate and much more considerable aid than would be indicated by the size of the appropriation requested. Moreover, appropriate steps would make certain that no portion of the equipment to be supplied or its equivalent would be permitted to find its way outside of pact countries.² The funds actually to be transmitted meanwhile would assist in rehabilitating Western European armaments to an extent that would enable the United States greatly to reduce arms subsidies within a few years. Experts guessed that, over a period of five to ten years, some ten to twenty billion dollars, in addition to such amounts as the various states might be able to provide from their own resources, might be required to place the alliance on a reasonably sound basis of defense.

Unfortunately, the arms program was brought forward at an awkward time. In the first place, with the pact still unrati ed, signs of “disinflation” became pronounced. The Congress took these indications to mean that the time was inopportune for any tax increases and that it would be economically dangerous to continue with deficit financing. Within the limits of anticipated national income and the essential character of other elements in the budget—the European Recovery Program and the domestic defense establishment being not least—it was difficult to provide for European rearmament except at the expense of other forms of budget expenditure relating to foreign policy. Powerful voices raised in protest gave pause to suggestions of this nature. Rallying to the defense of ERP in an address on June 11, 1949, President Truman insisted that “A slash in the funds for European recov-

ery at this time would be the worst kind of false economy. It would cancel the hopes and the plans of the Western European Nations. It would be a great gain for communism."³

Divergent Plans for Defense of the West

The situation was complicated, in the second place, by rival schools of thought as to the way in which the defense of the West could best be undertaken through the agency of the Atlantic Pact and in keeping with the U. N. Charter. There were cogent arguments to the effect that at no time could the allies hope to maintain in strong European defensive positions enough ground forces to offset Red armies totalling possibly 180 to 200 divisions, 30 to 40 of which could strike at once. Consequently, the only sensible course would be to waste little American substance on the rearmament of Europe, to maintain only a shock force in Germany, and otherwise to make sure of becoming so superlatively strong at home that the certainty of eventual success in a major war would deter the aggressor at the outset.

Other arguments, on analysis, have appeared to be more weighty. Considering that the first line of defense of the United States lies well beyond European shores, some authorities on strategy maintain that to surrender it without contest is to become vulnerable at once on the western shores of the Atlantic, since it appears to be probable that, unless stoutly supported, the European continental members of the Atlantic Pact will make no supreme effort to defend themselves. Moreover, it is clear that whenever Western Europe is overrun in war or conquered by communist ideology all United States post-war policies—the Truman Plan, the European Recovery Program, the rehabilitation of Germany, and the Atlantic Pact as a cornerstone of the United Nations—will collapse instantly. Afterward there would be no recognizable Western Europe to recover. Even the atomic bomb, according to expert opinion, could not stop Soviet armies once in motion.⁴

What, then, would be efficacious? No clear and convincing formula yet has been put forward. Fortunately, the announced intention of the United States to defend the Atlantic Pact nations—if not also others—already has acted as a deterrent to aggression. Also there can be no doubt that the stockpile of atomic bombs in the United States adds considerable weight to its foreign policies. But these advantages may be only temporary. In the long run, it appears unlikely that Europe can be defended from outside of Europe.

Thus, the American people face a problem that is both practical and urgent. They are confronted with the necessity of choosing among

courses of action all of which involve risk and sacrifice and not one of which is certain to be equal to all emergencies. Even after the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States can relapse into isolationism. It can abandon its allies and retreat from its first line of defense. Having thus abandoned prime strategic positions, it must assume a burden of North American defense which would promise to become ever heavier with the passage of time. Collective security under these circumstances would be deferred to an unknown and unlikely future.

Alternatively, given time—and the atomic bomb may provide that—a joint defense scheme presumably can be built up which eventually could be counted on to provide security for the free nations. The cost would be heavy at the outset but should diminish as strength accumulated and risks decreased. It would possess strong points both strategically and morally. A recovered Europe, able to provide for its own military needs, would become an ever stronger bulwark in plans for collective security and a stabilized world. A rebuilt West Germany presumably would reinforce Western Europe. It would not be unreasonable, then, to indulge in the hope that the Atlantic Pact in due time might enable the United Nations to bring about a general limitation in and control of armaments to the everlasting benefit of mankind.

Unanswered Questions Concerning the Arms Program

There still remain many troublesome questions to which answers are needed. Most of these have to do with the financial and economic burdens which the American people will be called upon to bear in the implementation of the Atlantic Pact. Among them are such questions as the following.

What control will the United States retain over the manner in which sums made available for European rearmament will be expended? What measures will be taken to appraise the results of such expenditures from time to time? What degree of coördination of arms programs of alliance member states is anticipated? To what extent could the Council of Europe or any of the agencies of the United Nations be useful in helping shape the arms program to advantage?

May there not be a disposition on the part of European members of the alliance who are intent on economic recovery to relax their own efforts to provide means or materials for rearmament and to permit the United States to bear a greater share of the burden of defense than would be required by their own economic circumstances? On the other hand, what restraining influences could be brought to bear should any

allied state be disposed to apply too large a share of its meagre resources to the military establishment when its real strength might be enhanced by placing greater emphasis on agricultural or industrial development?

Is it not possible that, in view of the enormous responsibility assumed by the United States for conditions arising out of its policy of containment, this country will be called upon to develop its own and other military establishments to an extent which might result in the permanent weakening of the nation without accomplishing any other positive results?

From the financial point of view, the Atlantic Pact may be regarded as a device for distributing some of the costs of a possible third world war over a lengthy interval of anticipated, but armed, peace. The American citizen doubtless will wish to be assured that in taking up the burden of the rearmament of Western Europe and other relevant responsibilities he will not be overcharged for the extent to which the risk of major conflict will be reduced during the lifetime of the North Atlantic Alliance. When this cost is added to the burdens already assumed under the Truman Program, the Marshall Plan, the maintenance of occupation forces in Germany, Austria and Trieste, and even the "bold new program" of President Truman's Point IV, while a major defense establishment is being built up at home, he will find the sum total very impressive indeed.

The Pact and the Outlook for Peace

However, while a good many specific questions arising out of the Atlantic Pact are not susceptible of definite answers in advance of actual experience, it is only necessary to consider alternatives to arrive at decisions on broad lines of procedure. There is ample reason to believe that an adequate implementation of the Atlantic Pact will not only avert the danger of war in the near future but even, within a measurable span of years, will reduce it to an unlikely contingency. The alternative to such a course would appear to be an increased risk of war in the immediate future and the probability of a third world war later on.

The imagination cannot easily grasp the meaning of this. It has been estimated that the direct cost to the United States of World War I had amounted, by June 1948, to approximately 31 billion dollars. Similar estimates show that the cost of World War II by the same date had reached the vicinity of 350 billion dollars. The indirect costs in both instances are beyond measuring. Another world war, fought prob-

ably on a still wider scale and with much more costly weapons, even if won by the "free" nations, could result only in a ruined, chaotic world. The assumption by the United States of the probable burdens involved in the approach to world peace through the Atlantic Pact would appear, consequently, to be fully justified in the absence of any other effective implementation of the United Nations Charter and in the face of a serious international emergency brought on by a major power whose basic philosophies differ fundamentally from those of the nations making common cause in the Atlantic Pact.

The bonds that free men place on themselves in forging and maintaining strong military establishments are uncomfortable and unsightly. They inhibit action and limit constructive achievement. Nevertheless, as a glimpse behind the Iron Curtain will testify, they are negligible in comparison with the shackles worn by slave and subject peoples. We must believe the rule of law in a free world, the essential rights of man, the dignity of the individual, to be obtainable at a price. If the price is high, is it too much to say that no cost is too great for the continued exercise of freedom that does not itself destroy that freedom?

1. Department of State, *The U. S. Military Assistance Program*, publication no. 3507; The Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. 20, no. 516 (May 22, 1949).

2. *New York Times*, May 14, 1949.

3. *New York Times*, June 12, 1949.

4. Hanson W. Baldwin in *New York Times*, May 29, 1949.

Appendix 1

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE PACT

1945

February 11—The Yalta Protocol and Agreement are concluded.

March 6—The American republics approve the Act of Chapultepec at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City. In the Act the governments declare "that every attack of a state against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American state, shall . . . be considered as an act of aggression against the other states which sign this Act. . . ."

April 25—Fifty nations meet for the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, California.

June 26—The Charter of the United Nations is signed by fifty countries which participated in the San Francisco Conference.

July 28—The United States Senate, by a vote of 89-2, consents to the ratification of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

August 1—The Potsdam Agreement is concluded.

October 24—The Charter of the United Nations enters into effect as twenty-ninth nation deposits instrument of ratification with the United States.

December 24—Secretary of State Byrnes proposes a four-power agreement among the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union for the purpose of keeping Germany disarmed.

1946

March 5—Winston Churchill recommends in a speech at Fulton, Mo., that the United States and Great Britain form a military alliance for mutual defense.

March 19—Iran files an official charge with U. N. against the U.S.S.R.

May 6—President Truman proposes that the United States arm the Americas for defense.

May 17—The United States proposes joint defense plans with Canada, particularly for the Arctic frontier.

August 21—The United States rejects the Soviet proposal that U.S.S.R. share control of Dardanelles with Turkey.

August 27—Seven United States warships are ordered to pay a "courtesy" visit to Greece.

1947

March 4—The Dunkirk Treaty, allying Great Britain and France, is signed.

March 12—The "Truman Doctrine" is outlined in the President's Message to Congress urging United States support of "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation" and appropriation of \$400 million in direct aid to Greece and Turkey.

March 17—The Brussels Treaty, basis of Western Union, is signed.

May 15—Congress gives final approval to the Greek-Turkish aid bill to implement the "Truman Doctrine."

June 5—Secretary of State Marshall makes a speech at Harvard advocating agreement on over-all needs as basis for United States economic aid to European nations.

June 17—Foreign Ministers Bevin of Great Britain and Bidault of France initiate conversations in Paris on Secretary Marshall's proposal.

July 12—Representatives of 16 nations which accepted the invitation of Foreign Ministers Bevin and Bidault meet in Paris.

September 2—The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Pact, is signed by the American Republics (19) represented at the Rio Conference.

October 6—The Cominform, new version of the Comintern, organized at Warsaw, is composed of representatives of the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania.

October 22—Gen. Zhdanov, speaking for the Cominform, asks that Communists everywhere oppose the Marshall Plan as an instrument of American imperialism.

October 24—Benelux countries exchange ratifications on their customs union agreement.

1948

January 22—Foreign Minister Bevin in the House of Commons proposes the unification of Western Europe.

February 23—The Communist party in Czechoslovakia gains control of the government through a *coup d'état*.

March 17—The Conference of representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on Western Union ends with the signature of a 50-year treaty of collective military aid and economic and social coöperation.

March 17—In an address to Congress President Truman states: "I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them do so."

April 2—Congress passes the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.

April 30—Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff of France, Great Britain and the Benelux nations meet in London and initiate joint military discussions.

May 19—The report issued by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the "Vandenberg Resolution" states that "the Committee is convinced that, until the United Nations has been strengthened sufficiently to assure universal security, the best means of reinforcing the security of individual members lies in progressive development of such regional and other collective defense arrangements."

June 11—The United States Senate passes Senate Resolution 239, the so-called "Vandenberg Resolution" which proposes "association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security."

July 6—Ambassadors to the United States from Canada, Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries meet with Under-Secretary of State Lovett for an exchange of views on European defense requirements.

July 20—It is stated in London that United States and Canadian military experts will join as "non-members" in the consultations of the Permanent Military Committee of the Brussels powers.

September 27—Foreign Secretary Bevin in a speech before the U. N. Security Council states: "If we cannot proceed on a world basis . . . we must proceed on a regional basis. . . ."

September 27, 28—The Defense Ministers of Western Union in conference at Paris announce agreement on common defense policy and formation of an organization to carry out that policy.

October 4—A military staff is appointed by Brussels Treaty powers.

October 26—The Consultative Council of the Western Union holds

its third meeting in Paris and agrees to seek a North Atlantic security pact.

October 28—The Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, announces that Canada has informed members of the Western European Union that Canada is prepared to enter into negotiations for a regional treaty of collective security.

November 11—Senator Vandenberg promises again that the United States will "aid other friendly, independent nations to stand on their own feet in defense of their own freedom."

November 19—Premier Salazar of Portugal in an interview declares: "The salvation of Portugal, Western Europe and the Occidental World lies in the formation of a true Atlantic bloc."

November 27—*The British Foreign Office announces completion of the draft of a North Atlantic Defense Pact by delegates of the five Western Powers.*

December 2—U.S.S.R. press warns Scandinavian countries against plans for a Scandinavian military bloc."

December 1—Secretary of Defense Forrestal declares that military equipment must be given generously to Western Europe to give meaning to the Brussels Treaty.

December 10—Negotiations for the North Atlantic Pact open between Acting Secretary of State Lovett, the Minister of Luxembourg, and the Ambassadors of Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

1949

January 10—President Truman, in his Budget Message, indicates that the principal measure of economic and military aid will go to the nations sharing U. S. international objectives.

January 14—A policy statement issued by the State Department cites Soviet opposition to majority policies in the U. N., Communist obstruction to the Marshall Plan, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Russian blockade of Berlin as leading to the Atlantic Pact.

January 20—*In his Inaugural Address President Truman recommends that the United States associate itself by treaty in a "collective defense arrangement" with free European countries.*

January 25—Formation of a Council for Economic Mutual Assistance among the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland.

- January 28*—The Western Union powers announce the creation of a Council of Europe composed of a Council of Ministers, an executive body, and a Legislative Assembly, representing the national parliaments, with advisory powers.
- January 29*—*The Soviet Union issues in Moscow a White Paper asserting that the North Atlantic Pact is intended to establish United States and British domination of the world by force.*
- January 29*—The U.S.S.R. asks the Norwegian Government to clarify its stand on the Atlantic Pact.
- January 29*—The Swedish Foreign Minister submits to the Scandinavian ministers meeting at Oslo a draft for a three-nation defense treaty outside of the proposed North Atlantic defense pact.
- January 30*—Plans for a defensive alliance between Norway, Sweden and Denmark, which had been under discussion for several months, are shelved.
- February 1*—In answer to the U.S.S.R.'s request of January 29, the Norse Government states that it will not enter into any agreement with other countries obligating Norway to grant bases on Norwegian territory unless Norway is attacked or threatened with attack.
- February 6*—The Soviet Union offers Norway a non-aggression pact and warns tacitly against joining a North Atlantic defense pact.
- February 11*—Secretary General of the United Nations Trygve Lie warns against regional pacts unless they recognize the supremacy of the United Nations.
- February 17*—The Turkish Foreign Minister proposes to the French Foreign Minister an extension of the North Atlantic Pact by a supplementary agreement for the defense of the Mediterranean area.
- February 18*—Secretary of State Acheson meets with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the North Atlantic Pact.
- February 20*—Senator Robert A. Taft endorses a strong North Atlantic security pact that would pledge United States aid to Western Europe in case of attack.
- February 21*—Greek Foreign Minister Tsaldaris states that Western European statesmen understand the desire of Greece and Turkey for a Mediterranean defense alliance to supplement the Atlantic Pact.
- February 22*—Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, states that French Communists would not fight the Soviet Union in the event of a war between that country and France.
- February 23*—The Minister for External Affairs of Eire informs the Dail that he had explained to the United States Eire's agreement

with the general aim of the North Atlantic Pact but that Eire could not undertake any military alliance with the state (Great Britain) responsible for partition.

February 26—Italian Communist leader Togliatti states that in case of conflict between the Soviet Union and Italy it would be the duty of Italians to aid the Soviet Army.

March 3—Norway requests and receives an invitation to join conversations on the North Atlantic security pact.

March 3—Norway rejects the Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact.

March 4—The Norwegian Ambassador to the United States joins the Ambassadors' Committee in Washington negotiating the North Atlantic Pact.

March 7—A draft of the proposed North Atlantic treaty is completed by the Ambassadors' Committee meeting in Washington and is sent to Canada and the Western European countries for official approval.

March 8—The Italian Cabinet backs Italy's participation in the North Atlantic Pact.

March 10—The Danish Foreign Minister arrives in Washington to discuss the North Atlantic Pact.

March 10—The British Cabinet approves the final draft of the Atlantic Pact.

March 10—The Soviet Finance Minister discloses that the Soviet Government plans to spend the equivalent of \$15 billion on its armed forces during the coming year, an increase of 20% over last year.

March 11—Premier de Gasperi of Italy announces in a session of the Chamber of Deputies that his government has approved Italy's participation in the North Atlantic Alliance.

March 12—The Danish Foreign Minister states that he had "satisfactory" talks with United States Department of State officials regarding Greenland's role in the Atlantic Pact.

March 13—Iceland's Foreign Minister arrives in Washington for talks on Atlantic Pact, stating that Iceland would refuse to grant peacetime bases to any foreign power.

March 14—The Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers begin a 2-day conference to coördinate Western European defense organization with the North Atlantic Pact.

March 14—Australia's Defense Minister states that he hopes for a Pacific defense pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty.

March 15—The Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers approve the terms of entry into the North Atlantic Pact at a conference in London.

- March 15*—Iranian officials voice fears that the Soviet Union plans to invoke the 1921 treaty whereby its troops might enter Iran on the pretext that the security of the Soviet Union is threatened.
- March 16*—The Portuguese Embassy in Washington issues a statement giving support to the principles of the North Atlantic Pact.
- March 16*—The French Cabinet approves the Atlantic Pact, at the same time expressing desire for further clarification of details of the armament program and military organization.
- March 17*—Invitations are issued to Italy, Portugal, Denmark and Iceland to join the Atlantic Alliance.
- March 18*—The total cost of the Marshall Plan for the four and a quarter year program is estimated as \$17,000,000,000 by Paul C. Hoffman, Economic Coöperation Administrator.
- March 18*—*The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is made public with indications that the Pact will be signed during the first week in April.*
- March 18*—Foreign Secretary Bevin champions the Atlantic Pact before the House of Commons and, later, in a broadcast, declares the treaty to be a strong defense against Communist encroachment and a great step toward world peace and security.
- March 19*—The Italian Chamber of Deputies votes, 342 to 170, in favor of Italy's adherence to the North Atlantic Pact.
- March 19*—A White Paper on "The North Atlantic Pact" is issued by the Department of State.
- March 20*—The Moscow radio denounces the North Atlantic Treaty and charges that a Pacific pact is being prepared as another link in the plan for "Anglo-American world domination."
- March 21*—The Russian newspaper *Pravda* of Leningrad accuses Finland of violating its peace treaty with the Soviet Union and warns against Finnish alignment with the Western powers.
- March 23*—Secretary of State Acheson supports the Iranian Government's denial to the Soviet Union that Iran is being converted into an American military base for operations against the U.S.S.R.
- March 23*—A plan to include France and Western Germany in the Benelux customs arrangement is reported to be under consideration.
- March 26*—France and Italy sign an economic agreement providing for the establishment of a customs union between the two countries within one year's time and an economic union in six years.
- March 31*—The U.S.S.R. delivers its official protest against the North Atlantic Treaty to the seven sponsoring nations.
- April 4*—The North Atlantic Treaty is signed by representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg,

Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Iceland, Canada, and the United States in Washington, D. C.

April 13—Soviet spokesman Andrei Gromyko, speaking in the U. N. Assembly, attacks the North Atlantic Pact as an aggressive bloc designed to provoke war.

April 27—Senate Foreign Relations Committee opens hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty.

April 29—Canada becomes first signatory nation to ratify the Atlantic Pact as House of Commons gives unanimous approval.

May 5—Representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, meeting in London, sign the Statute of the Council of Europe creating a European Parliament.

May 11—Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Ambassador of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Washington, proposes an Asiatic alliance similar to the North Atlantic regional defense arrangement.

May 12—Belgium completes ratification of the Atlantic Pact as Senate votes approval, 127 to 13. The Chamber of Deputies previously endorsed the treaty.

May 12—The British House of Commons ratifies the North Atlantic Pact by a vote of 336 to 6.

May 14—The Department of State outlines the forthcoming request for \$1,450,000,000 military aid program designed to assist members of the Atlantic Pact and other free nations in rebuilding their defense systems.

May 18—Secretary of State Acheson expresses opposition to the formation of a Pacific pact prior to the settlement of internal disturbances in Asiatic countries.

June 7—The report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously endorses the North Atlantic Treaty and asks ratification as a means of increasing the prospect of avoiding a third world war.

June—Maneuvers of the combined fleets of the Western European Union countries held this month demonstrate the type of collaboration provided for under the Atlantic Pact.

July 21—The United States Senate ratifies the North Atlantic Pact by a vote of 82 to 13.

Appendix 2

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY TEXT

Preamble

The Parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective

self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

Article 7

This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements

now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the

development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

Done at Washington, the 4th day of April, 1949.

Source: Department of State—*North Atlantic Treaty*. Publication 3464, March 1949.

Appendix 3

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER EXCERPTS

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent rights of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the Application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in Paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in Paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Source: The full text of the Charter is to be found in Goodrich and Hambro—*Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents*. 1946.

Appendix 4

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON GREEK AND TURKISH AID, MARCH 12, 1947

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elec-

tions, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

Appendix 5

EXCERPTS FROM INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

In the name of their Peoples, the Governments represented at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, desirous of consolidating and strengthening their relations of friendship and good neighborliness, and

CONSIDERING:

.

That the High Contracting Powers reiterate their will to remain united in an inter-American system consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and reaffirm the existence of the agreement which they have concluded concerning those matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which are appropriate for regional action;

.

That the obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics is essentially related to their democratic ideals and to their will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace;

That the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that juridical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of justice and security,

Have resolved, in conformity with the objectives stated above, to conclude the following Treaty, in order to assure peace, through adequate means, to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international relations not to resort to the threat or the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty.

. . . .

Article 3

1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.

. . . .

4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

. . . .

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties shall immediately send to the Security Council of the United Nations, in conformity with Articles 51 and 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, complete information concerning the activities undertaken or in contemplation in the exercise of the right of self-defense or for the purpose of maintaining inter-American peace and security.

Article 6

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

. . . .

Article 9

In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following shall be considered as such:

a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State;

b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another State.

Article 10

None of the provisions of this Treaty shall be construed as impairing the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

. . . .

Article 25

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but may be denounced by any High Contracting Party by a notification in writing to the Pan American Union, which shall inform all the other High Contracting Parties of each notification of denunciation received. After the expiration of two years from the date of the receipt by the Pan American Union of a notification of denunciation by any High Contracting Party, the present Treaty shall cease to be in force with respect to such State, but shall remain in full force and effect with respect to all the other High Contracting Parties.

Source: Department of State—Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security. 1948.

Appendix 6

PORTIONS OF THE BRUSSELS TREATY

[THE TITULAR HEADS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES]

Resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage; To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united; To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery; To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression; To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence,

Have appointed . . . their plenipotentiaries . . . who . . . have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organiza-

tions in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented, but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article 4

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

Article 5

All measures taken as a result of the preceding article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other High Contracting Party or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

Article 7

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create

a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

Article 10

The present treaty . . . shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years. . . .

Done at Brussels, this seventeenth day of March 1948. . . .

Source: The text of the Brussels Treaty is contained in Boyd—*Western Union: A Study of the Trend Toward European Unity*. 1948.

Appendix 7

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international coöperation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Source: Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2d Session, June 11, 1948.

Appendix 8

THE SOVIET ALLIANCE SYSTEM, 1942-1949

The Soviet Union has lost no opportunity to criticize and condemn any steps taken by the nations of Western Europe toward the formation of political blocs. The signing of the agreement on March 18, 1949, creating Western Union was severely condemned and the expansion of this pact into the North Atlantic Alliance likewise has been attacked as a move hostile to the U.S.S.R. Yet the Soviet authorities had begun the building up, by means of a series of alliances, of an "Eastern Union" as early as 1943. Other than the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of May 26, 1942 and the Franco-Soviet Alliance of December 10, 1944, both directed against Nazi Germany, Soviet alliances subsisting at present include the following:

Soviet-Czechoslovak—December 12, 1943
Soviet-Yugoslav—April 11, 1945
Soviet-Polish—April 21, 1945
Sino-Soviet—August 14, 1945
Soviet-Rumanian—February 4, 1948
Soviet-Hungarian—February 18, 1948
Soviet-Bulgarian—March 18, 1948
Soviet-Finnish—April 6, 1948

The Soviet Union has encouraged the drawing together of the members of its own alliance system, thus strengthening the bloc. Mutual assistance pacts formed within this system include the following:

Yugoslav-Polish—March 18, 1946
Yugoslav-Czechoslovak—May 9, 1946
Yugoslav-Albanian—July 9, 1946
Czechoslovak-Polish—March 10, 1947
Yugoslav-Bulgarian—November 27, 1947
Yugoslav-Hungarian—December 8, 1947
Bulgarian-Albanian—December 16, 1947
Yugoslav-Rumanian—December 19, 1947
Bulgarian-Rumanian—January 16, 1948

Hungarian-Rumanian—January 24, 1948

Bulgarian-Czechoslovak—April 23, 1948

Polish-Bulgarian—May 29, 1948

Polish-Hungarian—June 18, 1948

Hungarian-Bulgarian—July 16, 1948

Czechoslovak-Rumanian—July 21, 1948

Polish-Rumanian—January 26, 1949

Czechoslovak-Hungarian—April 16, 1949

There is considerable significance in the fact that, whereas the Rio Pact, the Brussels Treaty, and the North Atlantic Treaty all are multi-lateral instruments, the Soviet bloc has been built up wholly in terms of bilateral agreements.

Source: Based on an analysis in Department of State *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, no. 4, July 1948, pp. 219-227 and nos. 12-13, March-April 1949, pp. 681-684.

Appendix 9

EXCERPTS FROM OFFICIAL TEXT OF U.S.S.R. STATEMENT WITH REFERENCE TO A NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

If the institution of the Western Union conforms to the aims of the Anglo-American bloc in Europe, it is now already evident that the West-European grouping is but one, and not the main link in the system of measures contained in the plans for establishing Anglo-American world domination. While giving Great Britain the chief place in the Western Union, leading circles of the United States have every opportunity of influencing the way they want the policy of the entire West European grouping.

Nor should it be forgotten that the Treaty signed in Rio de Janeiro by the countries of North and South America, which assures the influence of ruling circles of the United States in regard to the overwhelming majority of these States, entered into force at the end of last year.

The realization of the Western Union in Europe and the entering into force of the Inter-American Pact is regarded by the State Department in the aforementioned document as an important prerequisite for promoting the policy of the United States on a world-wide scale. And the North Atlantic Pact is advanced as the chief instrument of this policy, with groupings of the countries already created in Europe and in America becoming props of that pact; from the very outset the ruling circles of the United States have taken over control of this entire business.

....

In point of fact the North Atlantic Pact represents the most far-reaching expression of the aggressive strivings of a narrow group of Powers, and first and foremost an expression of the strivings of the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain, which would like, in one way or another, to adjust to these ends the policy of the Governments of other states that are submissive to or directly dependent on them. It is perfectly clear, too, that both the Western Union and the inter-American grouping of states, just like the pacts of the Mediterranean states, the Scandinavian countries, the countries of South-

eastern Asia, etc., which are now being engineered, are closely bound up with the aims of the North Atlantic Pact, which serves as a guiding line in the Anglo-American plans for the establishment of domination in Western Europe, and in the North Atlantic, and in South America, and in the Mediterranean, and in Asia, and in Africa, and everywhere their hands can reach.

....

The State Department's official statement attempts to establish that the grounds for the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance, as also the other groupings mentioned above, are striving to "strengthen the United Nations organization." Such a statement would be convincing only if it were possible to agree that the formation of the North Atlantic Alliance and other groupings and blocs in circumvention of, and behind the back of, the United Nations organization could serve to strengthen this organization. Such an assumption, however, it stands to reason, is utterly absurd.

The North Atlantic grouping is being formed, not for purposes of self-defense and in general not for the tasks laid down in the aforementioned Article of the Charter. The North Atlantic Alliance headed by the United States would simply be of no use to anyone if there did not exist the striving forcibly to establish the domination of the United States and Great Britain over other countries, if there did not exist the striving to establish by force Anglo-American world domination. The North Atlantic Pact is by no means required for self-defense, but for the realization of the policy of aggression, for effecting the policy of unleashing a new war.

....

First Conclusion—The Soviet Union is compelled to reckon with the fact that the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain have adopted an openly aggressive political course, the final aim of which is to establish by force Anglo-American domination over the world, a course which is fully in accord with the policy of aggression, the policy of unleashing a new war pursued by them.

In view of this situation the Soviet Union has to wage an even more vigorous and more consistent struggle against each and every warmonger, against the policy of aggression and unleashing of a new war, for a world-wide, lasting, democratic peace.

In this struggle for the consolidation of universal peace and international security the Soviet Union regards as its allies all other peace-loving States and all those numberless supporters of universal democratic peace who voice the genuine sentiments and aspirations of the

peoples who bore on their shoulders the unbelievable burden of the last World War and who with every justification reject each and every aggressor and instigator of a new war.

Second Conclusion—Everyone sees that the United Nations organization is now being undermined, since this organization, at least to a certain extent, hampers and curbs the aggressive circles in their policy of aggression and unleashing of a new war.

In view of this situation the Soviet Union has to struggle, with even more firmness and persistence, against the undermining and destruction of the United Nations organization by aggressive elements and their accomplices, and must see to it that the United Nations organization does not connive with such elements as is often the case now, that it values its authority more highly when the matter consists in giving a rebuff to those pursuing a policy of aggression and unleashing of a new war.

Source: Full statement published in *U.S.S.R. Information Bulletin*, vol. ix, no. 3, February 11, 1949.

Appendix 10

OFFICIAL SOVIET PROTEST ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

London, Friday, April 1 (Reuters)—*Following is the text of a Soviet Government memorandum on the Atlantic Pact:*

On March 18 the State Department of the United States published the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, which the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Canada intend to sign within the next few days.

The text of the North Atlantic Treaty fully confirms what was said in the declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on January 29 this year, which is being attached hereto, both as regards the aggressive aims of this treaty and the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty contradicts the principles and aims of the United Nations Organization and the commitments which the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France have assumed under other treaties and agreements.

The statements contained in the North Atlantic Treaty that it is designated for defense and that it recognizes the principles of the United Nations Organization serve aims which have nothing in common either with the tasks of self-defense of the parties to the treaty or with real recognition of the aims and principles of the United Nations Organization.

Such great powers as the United States, Great Britain, and France are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

"Direction" of Treaty

Thus the treaty is not directed either against the United States of America, Great Britain or France.

Of the great powers only the Soviet Union is excluded from among the parties to this treaty, which can be explained only by the fact that this treaty is directed against the Soviet Union.

The fact that the North Atlantic Treaty is directed against the U.S.S.R. as well as against the countries of people's democracy was

definitely pointed out also by the official representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain and France.

To justify the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, references are being made to the fact that the Soviet Union has defensive treaties with the countries of people's democracy.

These references, however, are utterly untenable.

All the treaties of the Soviet Union on friendship and mutual assistance with the countries of people's democracy are of a bilateral nature, and they are directed solely against the possible repetition of German aggression, of which danger no single peace-loving state can be unaware.

The possibility of interpreting them as treaties which are in any degree aimed against the allies of the U.S.S.R. in the last war, against the United States or Great Britain or France, is absolutely precluded.

Moreover, the U.S.S.R. has similar treaties against a repetition of German aggression not only with the countries of people's democracy, but also with Great Britain and France.

Aspect of German Aggression

In contradiction to this, the North Atlantic Treaty is not a bilateral, but a multilateral treaty, which creates a closed grouping of states and, what is particularly important, absolutely ignores the possibility of a repetition of German aggression, not having consequently as its aim the prevention of a new German aggression.

And inasmuch as of the great powers which comprised the anti-Hitlerite coalition only the U.S.S.R. is not a party to this treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty must be regarded as a treaty directed against one of the chief allies of the United States, Great Britain, and France in the late war, against the U.S.S.R.

Participants in the North Atlantic Treaty are effecting extensive military measures which can in no way be justified by the interests of self-defense of these countries.

The extensive military measures carried out by the United States in cooperation with Great Britain and France under the present peacetime conditions, including the increase in all types of armed forces, the drafting of a plan for the utilization of the atomic weapon, the stockpiling of atom bombs, which are purely an offensive weapon, the building of a network of air and naval bases, etc.—by no means bear a defensive character.

The preservation in Washington of the combined Anglo-American Staff organized during the second World War, the recent establish-

ment of the military staff of the so-called Western Union in Fontainebleau (France), as well as the intention immediately to set up the defense committee envisaged by the North Atlantic Treaty, are by no means an indication of the peace loving or defensive aims of the participants of the treaty, but, together with other numerous military preparations, contribute to intensifying anxiety and alarm and to the whipping up of war hysteria in which all sorts of instigators of a new war are so interested.

Source: Documents Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty, printed for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949.

Appendix 11

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ATLANTIC PACT POWERS, APRIL 2, 1949

(Two days after the protest of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had been communicated to the seven sponsoring governments, representatives of the twelve countries gathered in Washington to sign the pact answered in a statement released to the public on April 2, 1949. This statement follows.)

The foreign ministers of the countries assembled here in Washington for the signing of the North Atlantic Pact have taken note of the views of the Soviet Government made public by that Government on March 31, 1949.

The foreign ministers note that the views expressed by the Soviet Government on March 31 are identical in their misinterpretation of the nature and intent of this association with those published by the Soviet Foreign Office in January, before the text of the pact was even in existence. It would thus appear that the views of the Soviet Government on this subject do not arise from an examination of the character and text of the North Atlantic Pact but from other considerations.

The text of the treaty itself is the best answer to such misrepresentations and allegations. The text makes clear the completely defensive nature of this pact, its conformity with both the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, and also the fact that the pact is not directed against any nations or group of nations but only against armed aggression.

Appendix 12

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
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